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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background and evidence 
Much has been written on the topic of democratization in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the context of EU accession. At first glance, this unique process of 
democratization by integration (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004) appears to be 
quite the success story: candidate countries benefitted from significant external 
incentives throughout their transition, while the EU had ample opportunity to help 
shape political institutions and practices in the post-communist space.  
However, this story does not end once membership is achieved. All Central and 
Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (hereafter 
CEECs) have undeniably become more democratic since the 1990s. This is largely 
due to the fact that candidate status is intrinsically linked to countries’ 
commitment to democratization and, as Dimitrova and Pridham suggest, this link 
translates into a process not easily reversed.  
A functioning democratic system is part of the Copenhagen criteria1, defining the 
conditions under which a country is eligible for accession: candidate countries are 
expected to develop a political system incorporating free and regular elections, the 
rule of law, citizens’ opportunities to participate in political decision making and 
press freedom. 
With such a powerful (and by all indications successful) process in motion, it 
would not be implausible to assume that CEECs would continue to improve their 
democratic standards after accession. However, as evidence presented below 
shows, this has not been the case.  
This observation comes from examining the Democracy Score calculated each year 
                                                          
1
 The Copenhagen criteria contain three main points that candidate states need to comply with: 
stability of democratic institutions, a functioning market economy and the ability to take on the 
obligations that come with membership, including those referring to the political, economic and 
monetary aims of the EU – see  
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm 
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by Freedom House for its Nations in Transit publication2. According to these 
reports, most CEECs have seen a steady increase in the Democracy Score index 
several years prior to accession. However, from 2004 and 2007 on, these scores 
followed a downward trend which presently indicates a worse situation than 
before accession. 
 
A quick examination of Table 1.1 tells us that this is not an uncommon 
phenomenon among CEECs.  
Table 1.1: Freedom House’s Democracy Score index for CEECs 
COUNTRY 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND
3
 
Bulgaria 3.25 3.18 2.93 2.89 2.86 3.04 3.04 3.07 -0.18 
Czech R. 2.33 2.29 2.25 2.25 2.14 2.18 2.21 2.18 -0.15 
Estonia 1.92 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.93 1.93 1.96 1.93 0.01 
Hungary 1.96 1.96 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.29 2.39 2.61 0.65 
Latvia 2.17 2.14 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.18 2.18 2.14 -0.03 
Lithuania 2.13 2.21 2.21 2.29 2.25 2.29 2.25 2.25 0.12 
Poland 1.75 2.00 2.14 2.36 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 0.46 
Romania 3.58 3.39 3.39 3.29 3.36 3.36 3.46 3.43 -0.15 
Slovakia 2.08 2.00 1.96 2.14 2.29 2.46 2.68 2.54 0.46 
Slovenia 1.75 1.68 1.75 1.82 1.86 1.93 1.93 1.93 0.18 
Source: Nations in Transit report 2011 
Most current member states from Central and Eastern Europe have seen a decline 
in the quality of their democratic regimes. According to the Nations in Transit 
2011 report, out of the 2004 accession wave, only the Czech Republic and Latvia 
saw an slight improvement in democratic quality afterwards, while in all others 
democracies appears to have declined to a greater or lesser extent. 
Romania and Bulgaria are special cases, and will remain so throughout this study. 
If we consider the entire 2004-2011 period, their democratic scores have 
                                                          
2 I prefer this index to Freedom House’s other measurement of democracy – Freedom in the World 
– because it provides more nuanced information on CEE democracies. The Freedom in the World 
ranking merely tells us that all ten countries were classified as ‘Free’ for the entire 2004-2011 
period. 
3 Note that because of the way the Democracy Score is measured, a negative trend indicates an 
improvement, while a positive trend signifies a drop in the score. See Chapter 4 for details.  
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improved. However, since accession in 2007, democratic quality has declined in 
both these countries.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index tells a similar story. In this 
case, it is only the Czech Republic – the highest ranking democracy in the list – 
which shows a very slight improvement.  
 
Table 1.2. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for CEECs 
COUNTRY 2006 2008 2010 2011 
Bulgaria 7.1 7.02 6.84 6.78 
Czech R. 8.17 8.19 8.19 8.19 
Estonia 7.74 7.68 7.68 7.61 
Hungary 7.53 7.44 7.21 7.04 
Latvia 7.37 7.23 7.05 7.05 
Lithuania 7.43 7.36 7.24 7.24 
Poland 7.3 7.3 7.05 7.12 
Romania 7.06 7.06 6.6 6.54 
Slovakia 7.4 7.33 7.35 7.35 
Slovenia 7.96 7.96 7.69 7.76 
Source: the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index report 2011 
 
This phenomenon of declining democratic quality is not an isolated one in Europe. 
The EIU’s Democracy Index reveals that most of the EU-15 member states have 
experienced a similar trend, with only Italy and the UK managing a slight 
improvement since 2004.  
Table 1.3. The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index for EU-15 
EU-15 2006 2008 2010 2011 
Austria 8.69 8.49 8.49 8.49 
Belgium 8.15 8.16 8.05 8.05 
Denmark 9.52 9.52 9.52 9.52 
Finland 9.25 9.25 9.19 9.06 
France 8.07 8.07 7.77 7.77 
Germany 8.82 8.82 8.38 8.34 
Greece 8.13 8.13 7.92 7.65 
Ireland 9.01 9.01 8.79 8.56 
Italy 7.73 7.98 7.83 7.74 
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Luxembourg 9.1 9.1 8.88 8.88 
Netherlands 9.66 9.53 8.99 8.99 
Portugal 8.16 8.05 8.02 7.81 
Spain 8.34 8.45 8.16 8.02 
Sweden 9.88 9.88 9.5 9.5 
UK 8.08 8.15 8.16 8.16 
Source: the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index report 2011 
 
While countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden were able to maintain high, 
relatively stable values throughout the period, others experienced more dramatic 
shifts. This tells us that some degree of democratic decline is a generalized 
tendency among EU members.  However, CEECs constitute the focus of this study.  
A clarification is needed before I move on to present the thesis’ core question and 
research tasks: the use of democracy indexes here is purely instrumental and 
aimed at observing overall trends, rather than attempting to say something about 
what kind of democracies exist in Central and Eastern Europe at the moment. Nor 
do these trends suggest that a backslide towards authoritarianism in the region is 
currently underway. Rather, their occurrence becomes interesting in the context of 
previously consistent democratic improvement.  
The view these indexes offer is in any case limited to attaching labels such as ‘full 
democracy’ or ‘semi-consolidated democracy’ to various countries. The theoretical 
framing of my study, which addresses the question of democratic forms in CEECs 
more thoroughly, is presented in the following chapter.   
 
1.2. Research tasks and the significance of the study 
Given this consistent tendency towards democratic decline among CEECs, with 
only a very small proportion of countries able to maintain the pre-accession 
improvement trend, this thesis asks:  
What were the conditions that influenced the evolution of post-accession 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe? 
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The question addresses both conditions of decline and improvement of democratic 
quality. It concerns the ten CEECs that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 
respectively, and focuses on the 2004-2011 time-frame4.  
The reason the question considers both outcomes is that the number of cases is 
relatively small, but also due to the nature of the method (qualitative comparative 
analysis) I opted for in my research. As I will explain in Chapter 3, this method 
allows us, for instance, to identify specific conditions fostering an improvement of 
democratic quality, but this does not automatically imply that the absence of these 
conditions translates into decline. As such, it is best to examine both outcomes 
individually.  
Throughout this research, I set myself three tasks: 
 to situate CEECs within current theoretical debates attempting to reconcile 
the need to re-conceptualize democracy with the dilemma of identifying a 
manageable number of democracy varieties;  
 to identify the specific conditions explaining the decline and improvement 
of democratic quality in the region; 
 to evaluate the EU’s post-accession impact on democratic quality in CEECs. 
 
This study is important in at least three ways. First, it deals with a phenomenon 
that is quite new. There is an extensive body of literature on the democratization 
of CEECs in general, and the EU’s role in this process in particular. However, due to 
the fact that the earilest CEE member states joined the EU in 2004, the study of 
how democracy evolved after accession is still on-going5. At present, we are in a 
favourable position to observe not only that this declining trend has become quite 
consistent over time, but also that it seems occur almost everywhere within the 
region. In this context, it is important to identify and discuss different possible 
                                                          
4
 Although some data is currently available for 2012 as well (for instance Freedom House’s Democracy 
Score) this is not the case for all variables, so for reasons of consistency, I have chosen to limit the tme-
frame to 2004-2011.  
5 See for example: Journal of Democracy vol. 18(4)/2007 (special issue on post-accession 
democracy in CEECs); also Zielonka (2005), Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) and Sedelmeier (2008) 
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causes of decline. Similarly, we may be able to learn something from those few 
cases that do not fit into the pattern. 
Secondly, this study is not a simple exercise in applying an existing model to a 
sample of cases and then interpreting the result. In my analysis framework, I draw 
to different degrees on two previous studies, but I adapt them in response to both 
the requirements of the method, and the nature of case sample. A few studies exist 
that use qualitative comparative analysis to examine CEECs for a similar purpose 
to that of this thesis (e.g., Gherghina , 2009; Schimmelfennig, 2005). However, they 
either use different case samples or different time-frames, and focus mainly on the 
pre-2004 period. To the best of my knowledge, no studies exist at the moment that 
use this same method to address the evolution of CEE democracies after accession.  
Finally, this thesis incorporates an attempt to evaluate the EU’s impact on CEE 
democracies after accession. Traditionally, the role that the EU played in shaping 
post-communist democracies was discussed in the context of political 
conditionality. However, once a country gains entry and the ”carrot” of accession is 
effectively removed, the EU’s impact on democracy becomes quite difficult to 
measure. Despite methodological difficulties though, no study of democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe can ignore the influence of the EU, regardless of 
reference period. Here, I approach this topic through a literature-based discussion 
aimed at complementing my other findings 
 
1.3. Structure 
From this point on, the study is divided into four parts. Chapter 2 contains an 
overview of the literature on democratic quality, and how it has evolved from 
trying to find patterns clarifying what “good democracy” means, to expanding the 
concept to accommodate an ever larger and more diverse array of cases. In this 
chapter, I also attempt to situate CEECs theoretically – in other words, to say 
something about what kind of democracies they are.   
Chapter 3 has two sections. In the first, I follow-up on the theoretical grounds of 
the previous chapter by explaining my choice of analysis frameworks and how I 
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combined and adjusted them into a final model.  The second section gives an 
overview of the principles and techniques of qualitative comparative analysis, and 
discusses its suitability for this study. 
Chapter 4 contains the analysis. It is divided in three parts: firstly, I present all 
variables and explain how they were coded; secondly, I conduct the qualitative 
comparative analysis and interpret the results; thirdly, I add the EU’s impact into 
discussion.   
Lastly, Chapter 5 summarizes this thesis’ findings, discusses any limitations that 
have emerged along the way, and contains a brief overview of further research 
avenues on the topic of post-accession democracy.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Few concepts in political science have had their definition more thoroughly 
debated than democracy. Since Dahl (1991) amended his definition of democracy 
with the notion that it is a theoretical ideal that no modern polity meets, a number 
of attempts were made to shift the discussion from ‘What makes an ideal 
democracy?’ to ‘What makes a good democracy?’ In other words, while such an 
ideal form cannot be achieved, political systems may nevertheless meet standards 
that would qualify them as “good democracies” 
The debate shifted again when it became clear, in the last few decades, that the 
term “democracy” was increasingly applied to countries that had moved away 
from authoritarianism, but did not quite meet the conditions of “good 
democracies”. Thus, political scientists began to acknowledge the need for a re-
conceptualization of democracy, in order to cover these emerging cases. This 
meant moving away from previous limited attempts at forming typologies based 
on “good democracies”. However, it also led to the emergence of an extraordinary 
number of types, or varieties of democracies, based on what set them apart rather 
than what qualified them as democratic.  
Following this development, the discussion took a turn towards organizing these 
types into more manageable classifications, while maintaining enough flexibility to 
cover a large array of cases. In short, the debate has gone from “What makes an 
ideal democracy?” to “What kinds of democracies are there?”  
Much of the literature on this topic is based on empirical research facilitated in 
particular by the third wave of democratization that emerged at the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s. It became clear at the time that the strict democracy-
authoritarianism dichotomy could no longer explain political forms, and that it 
needed to be nuanced. Additionally, a more differentiated understanding of 
democracy became useful not only as an instrument for describing cases, but also 
because democracy started to be increasingly used as a variable in causal analysis.  
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This chapter is conceived as an exploration of this shift from ideal forms to 
empirical varieties. I do not necessarily follow literature chronologically, but 
instead attempt to trace the logical evolution of the concept. In this, I achieve three 
things: firstly, I pinpoint some key moments in the theoretical debate; secondly, I 
explain how the empirical study of post-communist countries in Europe has 
contributed to the re-conceptualization of democracy; finally, I situate CEECs 
theoretically by identifying the typologies they belong to.   
 
2.1. Searching for patterns: what makes a good democracy? 
In Democracy and Its Critics (1991) Dahl defines the ideal type democratic process 
as being able to fulfill five criteria: effective participation, voting equality at the 
decisive stage, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and 
inclusiveness. In short, citizens should be able to form preferences and express 
them through votes, they should have free and equal access to policy information, 
should be able to decide which issues are brought to the public agenda, and should 
all be considered equal before the law.   
Dahl also identifies a number of favorable conditions for democracy: the control of 
military and police officials by elected representatives, a conductive political 
culture, favorable external conditions, a modern market economy and the absence 
of cultural conflicts. He posits that only countries where all these conditions are 
present will be able to develop and maintain democratic institutions. Where they 
exist only partially or where some are altogether absent, democracy is uncertain.  
In a similar approach, Morlino (2002) is interested in finding what makes a “good 
democracy”. Unlike Dahl though, he does not stop at identifying criteria for 
democracy, but also addresses the concept of quality of democracy.  
In Morlino’s view, a minimal definition of democracy includes universal adult 
suffrage, free and fair elections, more than one political party and more than one 
source of information. Quality, he explains further, is grounded in procedures, 
content and results. For a democratic process, these three dimensions translate 
into accountability, freedom and equality, and legitimacy respectively.  
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In other words, a good democracy is one with a stable institutional structure 
which ensures the liberty and equality of citizens (equality in terms of content) 
through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms. 
In such a system, citizens would be able to effectively hold their government 
accountable (quality in terms of procedure).  Legitimacy then becomes a sign that 
citizens are generally satisfied with their government (quality in terms of result).  
Interestingly, Morlino flatly excludes from the concept of “good democracy” any 
democracies that are flawed. Instead, he refers to quality democracies, and 
“democracies without quality”.  
He suggests that it is possible for good democracies to vary along five dimensions: 
procedural/rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, respect for citizens’ rights 
and freedoms, and a progressive implementation of greater political, social and 
economic equality. A political system that meets the requirements of a minimal 
democracy can, in addition, be categorized based on these five dimensions. For 
instance, a minimal democracy where the rule of law and accountability are both 
present is a responsible democracy. When responsiveness comes into the picture, 
it becomes a legitimate democracy. A political system where all five elements are 
present is a perfect democracy.  
Conversely, minimal democracies that do not exhibit at least one of these 
dimensions are referred to as “democracies without quality”. In this case, the 
absence of one or more dimensions serves to describe types such as irresponsive, 
reduced or unequal democracies. The verdict, however, remains quite categorical: 
a minimal democracy by itself is one without quality, and therefore it does not 
qualify as “good”. 
Where Dhal is concerned with ideal types and Morlino means to assess quality, 
Lijphart (1999) conducts an ambitious empirical study, which leads him to 
conclude that one particular type of democracy may be “kinder” to its citizens in 
terms of representation and participation. 
Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy is one of the most thorough and largely successful 
attempts to lend some order to the concept of democracy based on empirical 
research. It subscribes to Dahl’s definition of democracy – essentially focused 
around political rights and civil liberties – but gives us a powerful model for 
explaining relations among different institutions in democratic countries.  
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Lijphart’s analysis observes how ten institutional variables cluster along two 
dimensions to describe two alternative patterns of democracy. These two 
dimensions are: executive-parties (referring to the concentration of power within 
central government) and federal-unitary (the dispersion of power towards 
institutions outside central government). The two patterns that Lijphart identifies 
are majoritarian and consensus democracy.  
Majoritarian democracies exhibit two-party systems, single party or minimum 
winning coalition cabinets, executive dominance in relation to legislature, 
majoritarian electoral systems and pluralism of interest groups. They are usually 
unitary, centralized governments, have unicameral legislatures and flexible, easily 
amended constitutions, as well as a low degree of central bank independence.  
Conversely, consensus democracies are characterized by multiparty systems, the 
concentration of executive power in minority cabinets, a balance of power 
between the executive and the legislative, PR electoral systems and strong 
corporatism. They are organized along a federal/decentralized structure, have 
bicameral legislatures, rigid constitutions and highly independent central banks. 
The study concludes that consensus democracies generally perform better in 
terms of representation, inclusiveness and political participation of citizens. 
Lijphart’s typology has the advantage of being more exhaustive than, for instance, 
classifying democracies into parliamentary and presidential, but it is not without 
flaws. One major problem stems from the fact that the model has proven difficult 
to apply to newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and Asia (Bormann, 
2010).  
Lijphart’s typology was derived by examining thirty-six established democracies – 
countries which, by the mid 1990s, had already been democracies for at least two 
decades. Out of these, 20 have been continuously democratic since the 1940s and 
form a relatively homogenous group of economically developed and highly 
urbanized countries, concentrated around the North Atlantic region.  
While the second and third wave of democratization introduced more diversity to 
the group, reproducing Lijphart’s analysis on samples of younger democracies has 
repeatedly revealed that they do not fit into the model.  
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2.2. Breaking the patterns: Central and Eastern Europe 
Since Samuel Huntington introduced the concept of democratization waves in 
1991, many political scientists have taken for granted the idea that democracy is a 
phenomenon characterized by a succession of steps forward, followed by steps 
back. Briefly, Huntington argued that, at the time of his writing, three major waves 
of democratization could be identified, with a wave being defined as a group of 
countries transitioning from authoritarian to (minimal) democratic systems. The 
first wave encompassed Western European and North American democracies 
emerging in the 19th century and was followed by a reverse wave during the 
interwar period. The second wave began after World War II and came to a halt in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The latest wave began in the mid-1970s and spread to Latin 
American and Central-Eastern European democracies. Huntington suggested that 
a third reverse wave could also be expected to occur.  
Although the notion of democratization waves is widely accepted, it has 
nevertheless come under criticism, both in terms of conceptual and empirical 
accuracy. Doorenspleet (2000) points out that, despite adopting Dahl’s three 
democratic requirements of competition, inclusiveness and civil liberties, 
Huntington tends to focus heavily on competition at the expense of inclusion, by 
going so far as to dismiss the right to universal suffrage in a number of cases.  
Further, Doorenspleet argues that Huntington’s study reveals some empirical 
errors. Firstly, while a reverse wave may be characterized by a lower number of 
(minimal) democracies, it does not necessarily mean that these countries have 
fully reverted to authoritarian systems, but may instead experience an 
“interrupted period” in democratization. Secondly, Huntington evaluates the state 
of democratization by taking into account the proportion of minimal democracies 
around the world. Doorenspleet explains that this expression may give distorted 
results simply because the denominator – the number of countries in the world – 
is not a constant number over time. She shows, for instance, that the percentage of 
minimal democracies has decreased from 32% to 26% between 1957 and 1972, 
but the number of minimal democracies has actually increased. This contradiction 
is easily explained by taking into account that the number of independent states in 
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the world grew during this period, largely due to the decolonization of Africa. 
According to Huntington, the emergence of these new states under largely 
authoritarian regimes contribute to a swing away from democracy in the form of a 
reverse wave. However, Doorenspleet argues that this is not the case, since these 
countries are not reverting from democracy to authoritarianism, but rather are 
authoritarian regimes being installed directly following independence.  
Regardless of whether democratization waves remain a valid concept today, it is 
undeniable that many countries in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced a 
significant degree of democratization since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Out of 
the 29 countries included in the latest Nations in Transit ranking (2012), the ones 
classified as consolidated democracies are all countries that joined the EU in 2004. 
Romania and Bulgaria are classified as semi-consolidated democracies, as are 
Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro. The remaining fourteen countries are either 
hybrid or authoritarian regimes.  
It needs to be restated, at this point, that the recent decline in democratic quality 
outlined in the first chapter of this thesis should not be understood as support for 
Huntington’s claim that a third reverse wave may be expected to occur. Rather, 
when studying the nature of this decline, we must consider that contemporary 
democracy indexes tell us how democratic a country is by placing it on a 
democracy-authoritarianism axis. In doing so, they tend to sacrifice diversity 
inside different categories.  
Rankings compiled by Freedom House or the Economist Intelligence Unit tell us 
whether a democracy is consolidated (full) or semi-consolidated (flawed), but do 
not allow for more subtle differentiations within this type of regime. Effectively, 
what these rankings reflect is the degree to which a country tends towards 
democracy or authoritarianism.  This lack of diversity clearly illustrates the need 
to replace the democracy-authoritarianism dichotomy with a more nuanced 
concept of democracy.  
Returning briefly to Lijphart’s patterns of democracy, a number of attempts were 
made to replicate the study on CEECs. Of these, one of the most exhaustive belongs 
to Andrew Roberts (2006). 
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By analyzing the same ten CEECs that form the focus of my thesis, Roberts sets 
himself the task of discovering which of the two patterns these young CEEC 
democracies fit into.  His findings show that Lijphart’s model applies only partially. 
On the executive-parties dimension, CEECs tend to behave as consensus 
democracies with regards to executive-legislative relations, party systems and 
cabinets. However, in relation to disproportionality and interest groups, they are 
decidedly majoritarian.  
On the federal-unitary dimension, the ten CEECs are highly centralized and tend to 
have unicameral legislatures. In this respect, they behave as majoritarian 
democracies. But in terms of central bank independence, constitutional flexibility 
and judicial review, they behave as consensus democracies.  
Lijphart finds significant correlations between variables inside the two 
dimensions, but not between variables across dimensions. By testing this model on 
the ten CEECs, Roberts finds that, on the contrary, most correlations between 
variables within the dimensions do not occur as they should. For instance, while 
on the executive-parties dimension these countries tend towards consensus, 
interest group relations appear to be decidedly pluralistic. On the federal-unitary 
dimension, the only correlation that corroborates Lijphart’s findings is between 
bank independence and judicial review. Roberts’ conclusion also finds 
considerable support in Fortin’s study (2008) and more generally in Vatter and 
Bernauer (2009). 
In a similar attempt, the latter authors replicate Lijphart’s study to identify 
institutional patterns in 25 EU members between 1997 and 2006 (excluding 
Cyprus and Malta). In addition to the executive-parties and federal-unitary 
dimensions, they incorporate a direct democracy dimension.  
Their findings show that CEECs do indeed behave differently from Western 
democracies: they combine a low degree of interest group corporatism with 
stronger judicial review and weaker central banks, thus again breaking the 
patterns. Conversely, the remaining 15 Western democracies conform not only to 
Lijphart’s original patterns, but also to the one adjusted to include direct 
democracy institutions.  
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These attempts show that Lijphart’s model remains perfectly capable of explaining 
how and why institutional patterns occur in established democracies. However, 
the situation changes when we turn to CEECs. Not only do these countries fail to 
fall into one pattern or the other. But very few correlations within the dimensions 
make sense.  
However, all ten CEECs being examined here meet at least the minimal definition 
of democracy, so that we cannot classify them as a different type of political 
system based on the fact that they do not fit into widely accepted patterns, or that 
they are flawed.  
The term “flawed democracy” does not convey a lot of information. It tells us that a 
democracy does not conform to standards – whether those of a good democracy or 
those of resilient patterns. It does not, however, say anything about how and why 
it is flawed. From here stems the need to re-conceptualize democracy in a way that 
would allow for such explanations.  
 
2.3. “Democracy with adjectives” and the dilemma of variety 
Collier and Levitsky (2006) argue that, in attempting to re-conceptualize 
democracy for this purpose, two contradictory goals have emerged: increasing 
conceptual differentiation to capture more forms of democracy, and conceptual 
stretching, by applying definitions of democracy to countries that exhibit a variety 
of features that would not qualify them as democracies. Thus nowadays, one of 
some 500 adjectives can be attached to the concept of democracy to describe its 
particular typology.  
The inherent disadvantage of such great diversity is that it is difficult to manage. 
Collier and Levitsky suggest three strategies for standardizing terminology while 
avoiding the trap of contradictory goals.  
The first is contextualizing the definition of democracy. This means that the 
definition should be adapted when applying it to atypical cases - often by 
introducing new criteria to establish the cut-off point between what can be 
categorized as a democracy or non-democracy.  
The second strategy involves shifting between overarching concepts to which 
democracy is related. Traditionally, democracy has been associated with the 
overarching concept of political regime. However, more recent literature 
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recognizes that democracy can be related to other concepts, such as governance, 
polity, society or state. Collier and Levitsky argue that combining democracy with 
different such overarching concepts may yield different types. Thus, shifting 
between overarching concepts helps avoid stretching the definition, but without 
necessarily sacrificing analytical diversity.  
Finally, a third strategy involves forming sub-types: derivative concepts created in 
relation to and as a modification of some other concept. In short, this concerns 
adding adjectives to the concept of democracy.  
With regards to established democracies, Collier and Levitsky adopt an approach 
similar to Morlino’s: they can be defined on a scale running from a minimalist 
(broad suffrage, reasonably competitive elections with no massive fraud) to a 
maximalist concept of democracy (incorporating socio-economic equality and high 
levels of citizenship participation) 
With flawed democracies, the issue lies with the fact that they are generally seen 
as democratic, but differ in terms of what, precisely, makes them flawed. In this 
case, differentiation is concerned with reflecting the problematic element. This 
leads to categories such as low intensity democracies (low effective citizen 
participation), low-income democracies (unfavorable socio-economic conditions), 
neocolonial democracies (weak national sovereignty) and so on. Where the source 
of the flaw is not clear, a wider concept of incomplete or problematic democracy 
can be used.  
Collier and Levitsky do not claim to offer a definitive solution to the dilemma of 
excessive diversity. The importance of their work within this debate lies with 
arguing in favor of a balance between diversity and categorization.  
At this point, we have moved quite far from the starting point, where the concept 
of democracy was predominantly discussed in the context of established 
democracies. We are now firmly in the territory of flawed democracies, and have 
gained enough insight to try and locate where exactly in this wide category might 
CEECs fall.  
In order to do this, one last concept needs to be introduced in relation to 
democracy: embeddedness.  
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2.4. Embedded and defective democracies 
Merkel (2004) explains that, for a long time, literature on transition and 
consolidation assumed that new democracies could take two routes: back to 
authoritarian regimes, or forward towards consolidated liberal democracies. 
However, merely adopting a democratic constitution and implementing free and 
fair elections does not automatically foster liberal democracies. Political reality 
indicates that an increasing number of countries have adopted a combination of 
democratic and authoritarian norms, without exclusively following one rule or the 
other 
Over the past decade, Freedom House reports have become the go-to source for 
systematic, easily quantifiable evaluations of democracy in Central and Eastern 
Europe. However, Merkel criticizes Freedom House’s democracy score by 
explaining that, under it, the minimal requirement for countries to be classified as 
democracies is to have free, fair and regular elections. This leads to a definition of 
democracy that is even more limited than the minimal concept seen in Dahl and 
Morlino. A further problem comes from this index – and others like it – being 
created on the basis of the democracy-authoritarianism dichotomy. As previously 
mentioned here, in order to understand how democracy evolved in CEECs, this 
dichotomy is better replaced by a more meaningful concept.  
Merkel proposes the notion of embedded democracy. This term is based on the idea 
that stable democracies are embedded in two ways: internally, its functions are 
ensured by the interdependence of different partial regimes of a democracy; 
externally, these partial regimes are reinforced by favorable conditions that 
protect it from destabilizing tendencies. The partial regimes of a democracy cover 
(1) electoral processes; (2) political rights of participation; (3) civil rights; (4) 
horizontal accountability; and (5) a guarantee that the democratically elected 
representatives hold the effective power to govern.   
The logic of internal embeddedness lies in the interdependence of these partial 
regimes. Thus, universal active suffrage together with free and fair elections is the 
feature that distinguishes democracies from authoritarian regimes. However, 
while this is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient to support a meaningful 
definition of democracy. The minimal condition for embedded democracies 
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requires that the electoral regime be connected to political and civil rights, which 
guarantee the pre-conditions for elections, rule of law and the public’s control over 
representatives between elections. The latter is further reinforced by the 
remaining two partial regimes, which ensure that there is an effective system of 
checks and balances and that no extra-constitutional actors hold the effective 
power to govern.  
External embeddedness specifies the favourable outside context that reinforces a 
country’s internal embededdness and protects it from possible disruptive 
elements. This sphere of external embeddedness is where it becomes possible to 
observe the conditions that make it possible to raise or lower the quality of 
democracy.  
Merkel identifies these conditions as: the socio-economic context, civil society and 
international integration. In the first sphere, a developed economy, fair 
distribution of resources and the pluralization of social structure create a 
favorable environment for democracy and can help improve its quality.  The role 
of civil society is to ensure that citizens are protected from the arbitrary use of 
state power, to support the rule of law and balance of powers, and to cultivate a 
political culture that resonates with the core values of democracy. Finally, 
international integration helps consolidate democracy by disseminating practices 
and facilitating social learning.  
To summarize, the concept of embedded democracy means that the stronger, more 
consolidated external embeddedness is, the better it protects the partial regimes 
of democracy from destabilizing factors. The tighter the interdependence between 
these partial regimes, the more stable internal embeddedness becomes. The 
reverse is also true – and here is the point where defective democracies are 
addressed.     
Merkel recognizes that there are several success stories in the third wave of 
democratization, but the majority of cases turned out to be flawed to some degree.  
The problematic element almost always comes from one of the partial regimes 
being damaged to a point where it affects the logic of internal embeddedness. In 
other words, the partial regimes are no longer linked as they should.  
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Based on this, Merkel reshapes the democracy-authoritarianism dichotomy into a 
continuum, along which he places four types of defective democracies: 
 Exclusive democracies, where one or more segments of the population are 
excluded from the right of universal suffrage 
 Domain democracies, where ‘veto powers’ (the military, entrepreneurs, 
multi-national corporations) remove one or more political domains from 
the hands of democratically elected representatives 
 Illiberal democracies, where the rule of law is damaged, civil rights are 
partially suspended and the executive/legislative control of the state is 
weakly limited by the judiciary 
 Delegative democracies, where the system of checks and balances is 
damaged and the legislature and judiciary branches have little control over 
the executive. 
 
The third type appears to be the most common among defective democracies. 
Examining 29 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia and Latin 
America, Merkel finds 22 cases of illiberal democracy.  
Interestingly though, according to his evaluation, the majority of CEECs are not, in 
fact, defective. They qualify as liberal, with the exception of Romania and Bulgaria 
(illiberal) and Latvia (exclusive, considering the issues of the Russian-speaking 
minority). 
This is also the theoretical stance and typology that I adopt in my thesis, for two 
reasons: firstly, this is the most thorough attempt at classification of CEECs I have 
found that conforms to Collier and Levitsky’s suggestion that a balance must be 
struck between diversity and categorization. Secondly, at the time of his writing 
(2004) Merkel explicitly states his opinion that there are good reasons to expect 
that evolution of democratic quality in CEECs will follow a positive trend. I have 
shown that this is not in fact the case, and that a number of plausible explanations 
can be found in the sphere of external embeddedness. This point will be further 
detailed in the following chapters.  
On a final note: Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy may appear reminiscent 
of Dahl’s ideal type: a solid, mutually reinforcing institutional structure protected 
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by a developed economy, a healthy political culture and a favorable international 
environment.  
However, together with other researchers, Merkel has taken his concept of 
embedded democracy a step further, to create the Democracy Barometer – the 
most recent development in measuring the quality of democracy6. While it has not 
yet been applied to the cases and time-frame discussed in this thesis, its existence 
is worth noting, particularly because it is based on a concept that may potentially 
challenge Freedom House’s indexes and other standards in the field.  
 
2.5. Summary: between quality and variety 
The aim of this chapter has been to give an overview of the scientific debate 
surrounding the re-conceptualization of democracy over the past two decades. The 
overarching theme of this debate is a shift away from defining democracy in ideal 
terms, towards achieving a typology that allows the inclusion of flawed 
democracies. It draws support from extensive empirical research, which has 
proven capable both of producing powerful explanations for institutional 
configuration, and of signaling the need for new, improved models.   
One particularly interesting aspect of this debate is that it is not always clear 
where the line between “quality of democracy” and “varieties of democracy” exists. 
The literature I have surveyed here would suggest that, as we move away from the 
ideal type democracy towards more inclusive concepts, we are also moving from a 
perspective of quality towards one of variety.  
However, this is not entirely the case. Lijphart clearly approaches democracy in 
terms of typology (albeit limited to two types). But in a sense, so does Morlino. His 
approach to democracy is essentially one of scale, running from minimal to 
maximal. Thus, the more inclusive, responsive and accountable a democracy 
grows, the better it becomes in terms of quality. But moving up and down this 
scale, Morlino also ends up defining several types of democracies.  
Similarly, while Merkel obviously leans more towards typology, he does not 
discount quality, which he places within the sphere of external embeddedness. In 
keeping with this theoretical stance, I adopt the concept of quality of democracy 
                                                          
6
 For details and further publications see: http://www.democracybarometer.org/ 
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(or democratic quality) as the outcome and dependent variable to be examined in 
the following chapters.  
It is not my purpose here to identify any further typologies that might describe 
democracy in CEECs. Hopefully, this chapter has made it clear that this is neither 
particularly necessary, nor manageable in the limited scope of this study. To 
remind: the core question this thesis addresses is why democracy in CEECs 
evolved the way it did post-accession.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD  
 
In this chapter I discuss the research design and method for my analysis. There are 
two main sections. The first contains a detailed discussion of the two models that 
form the basis of my research design, the adjustments I made to these, and finally, 
the definitive model to be applied in my analysis. The second section gives an 
overview of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and discusses its suitability 
and potential limitations in the context of this study. 
 
3.1. RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DESIGN 
3.1.1. Clarifications 
Before I introduce the research design, two clarifications are needed.  
Firstly, this research uses both dichotomous and continuous variables, which 
reflects on how they are operationalized and measured. Working with 
dichotomous variables is relatively straightforward in the context of qualitative 
comparative analysis (see section 3.2. below) For instance, a variable indicating 
the presence or absence of a parliamentary system in a country can easily be 
coded as (1) and (0) respectively. Some difficulty arises when working with 
variables whose values change over time, as QCA requires that all variables take 
dichotomous values. Gherghina (2009), on whose study my research design is 
partially based, transforms continuous variables, such as GDP/capita, by observing 
trends rather than specific values. For example, he suggests coding positive trends 
as (1) and negative or stagnating trends as (0). This paper uses the same strategy. 
However, due to QCA technicalities that will be discussed in the following section, 
the coding is not always as straightforward as assigning a (1) value to positive 
trends and a (0) value otherwise. In some cases, thresholds need to be specified to 
ensure there is enough variety among the cases to allow meaningful results. These 
thresholds are explained in detail for each variable in Chapter 4.  
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Secondly, we must consider the analysis time-frame. As I have already explained in 
the introduction, this study is concerned with the evolution of democratic quality 
in CEECs post-accession. However, the ten countries included are not a uniform 
set, in that eight became EU members in 2004, and two followed later in 2007. This 
poses a problem, as the analysis excludes, for reasons to be detailed here, one 
particular factor affecting democratic quality. Political conditionality exercised by 
the EU is technically still in effect for Bulgaria and Romania at the start of the 
reference period, which makes it difficult to analyze the set as a whole between 
2004 and 2011. There is substantial evidence that political conditionality has had a 
positive effect on consolidating CEE democracies (Grabbe, 2001, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig, 2004; Schimmelfennig et al., 2005; see also Chapter 4 of this 
thesis). This can easily be confirmed by also looking at the data provided in Table 
1.1: Freedom House democracy scores for Bulgaria and Romania appear to have 
actually improved since 2004 by 0.18 and 0.15 percentage points respectively. 
However, after their 2007 accession the scores begin to drop, conforming to the 
overall trend observed in CEECs. 
One possible way to solve this problem is to exclude Romania and Bulgaria 
altogether from the QCA part of this study and examine them separately. However, 
this leaves us with eight countries to look at, which Rhioux and De Meur (2009) 
suggest may be too small a number of cases. While one of the defining strengths of 
QCA is its ability to analyze small-N sets, two few cases would make it difficult to 
draw meaningful results. Similarly, applying QCA to Romania and Bulgaria as a 
separate set makes little sense, as conditions for only two cases can be quite easily 
examined by themselves.  
A second option for solving the problem of sub-sets is to acknowledge that 
political conditionality continues to have a positive influence on democratic 
development in Bulgaria and Romania for part of the 2004-2011 time-frame, but 
exclude this variable from the analysis, as it is quite difficult to measure. 
Nevertheless, even with the direct impact of political conditionality removed, it 
would be incorrect to completely discount the EU’s influence on CEEC democracies 
post-accession.  
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Here I have chosen to use the second option, excluding the EU’s role from the QCA 
part, and discussing it separately after completing the analysis. With these 
considerations in mind, in the following sub-sections I detail the basis for my 
analysis model along with several adjustments, its final form and an overview of 
specific analysis steps.  
 
3.1.2. Previous research 
This research is modeled after two previous studies. Gherghina’s paper on the role 
of the EU in the democratization of post-communist Europe (2009) is useful in 
terms of method and approach. While primarily concerned with the role of 
political conditionality in democratizing the post-communist space, the study does 
offer a good example of how a variety of external and domestic factors affecting 
the quality of democracy can be observed using QCA. Additionally, Gherghina 
works with the same types of variables used in this thesis and provides a valuable 
coding strategy for transforming continuous variables into dichotomous ones.  
My thesis intends to go beyond Gherghina’s study in two respects. Firstly, in line 
with the theoretical background presented in the previous chapter, it replaces the 
concept of democratization with one of democratic quality. Secondly, while using 
the same analysis method, it focuses on a particular sample and time-frame where 
the “carrot and stick” of EU accession are effectively removed, thus allowing us to 
examine how other factors may have contributed to the evolution of CEE 
democracies post-accession.  
The second study that lends us a more substantial theoretical basis is Buhlmann’s 
(2011) overview of how democratic quality has evolved in 53 countries in the 
world between 1990 and 2007. Buhlmann places his work in the wider context of 
embedded/defective democracies and the Democracy Barometer. The study itself 
does not primarily focus on measuring embeddedness in these democracies, but it 
nevertheless offers a sufficiently complex framework for explaining why 
democratic quality varies. 
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Buhlmann’s reasoning is as follows: while the Democracy Barometer allows us to 
describe a variety of democracies in terms of quality, the large number of variables 
involved in calculating the index itself can make it difficult to rigorously explain 
why democratic quality changes across countries and over time. He suggests 
instead that three other sources could be used to explain this variation: 
modernization theory, human development and institutions.  
The main argument of modernization theory is that democracy is essentially 
driven by the economy: a wealthy country is more likely to develop a high-quality 
democratic regime (Lipset, 1981). However, economic prosperity alone cannot 
offer a sound socio-economic basis for a good democracy. Both Buhlmann and 
Merkel (2004) recognize the importance of resource distribution in relation to 
economic development. Merkel uses the economic prosperity argument to explain 
the nature of external democratic embededness, but amends that, regardless of 
wealth, unequal resource distribution results in large economic gaps between 
categories of citizens, whereby part of the population is forced under the poverty 
line. This affects the way they engage in political participation. Conversely, a more 
homogenous distribution among citizens creates more opportunities for equal 
participation in the democratic process. Thus, political equality in a country is 
directly influenced by its socio-economic conditions.   
Linked to this idea is Buhlmann’s claim that the quality of democracy is also 
affected by globalization and a countries’ ability to withstand economic crises. 
While recognizing the existence of opposing views on whether or not globalization 
enhances democratic quality, he opts for using countries’ economic openness as a 
positive measure of democracy. Further, he explains that countries which are well 
equipped to deal with economic crises are also more capable of maintaining high 
democratic standards.  
A second possible explanation for democratic quality, human development, 
maintains that better socio-economic development (ready access to education and 
health services, high life expectancy) leads to a higher quality of democracy. This 
point is relatively straightforward and helps reinforce the claims presented under 
the modernization theory. However, Dahl (1998) argues that, while there is 
substantial evidence in favor of a link between democracy and human 
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development, it is difficult to tell whether the latter is a favorable condition for the 
former, or a by-product of it. In other words, we cannot readily claim that human 
development is a cause of high quality democracies.  
The final explanation proposed by Buhlmann draws on the conclusions of 
Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy, explaining why consensus democracies are 
better than majoritarian ones. To remind, Lijphart argues that the institutional 
architecture of consensus democracies favors a higher degree of inclusiveness and 
representation. This type of institutional make-up includes executive power-
sharing in coalitions, multiparty and PR electoral systems, bicameralism and 
decentralized governments. Out of these, Buhlmann chooses parliamentary and PR 
electoral systems as conditions fostering better quality democracies. He argues 
that parliamentary systems offer better representation and are generally more 
accountable, while offering better protection against ruptures caused by policy 
changes under more rigid presidential-systems. Similarly, PR electoral systems are 
more inclusive compared to majoritarian ones, in that they allow power sharing 
and reduce barriers for smaller parties, thus allowing for better inclusiveness of 
different interest groups.   
In short, Buhlmann’s analysis model proposes the following hypotheses: the 
wealthier, more globalized and economically stable a country is, the better its 
quality of democracy; the higher a country’s level of human development, the 
better its quality of democracy; countries with parliamentary and PR electoral 
systems have higher quality democracies. Based on these, he proceeds to define six 
indicators as measurements of the conditions detailed in his model: 
 GDP/capita – a measure of economic prosperity; 
 Globalization – a combination of economic flows and restrictions 
measuring a country’s economic openness; 
 Inflation – an indicator of price fluctuation; 
 Human development index (HDI) – a measure of human development 
combining life expectancy, education and gross national income/capita; 
 PR system – an indicator showing the presence or absence of a PR electoral 
system in a country; 
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 Parliamentary system – an indicator showing the presence or absence of a 
parliamentary system in a country. 
Buhlmann then uses multi-level analysis (a derivation of panel data analysis) to 
explain variations in democratic quality within his sample of 53 countries.  
My own analysis borrows much from Buhlmann’s study, but departs from it in 
three ways. Firstly, it uses a different method to attempt an explanation of why 
democratic quality varies within a smaller sample. Secondly, it goes beyond the 
1993-2007 time-frame of both Buhlmann’s work and the Democracy Barometer. 
Thirdly, while generally adhering to the economic and institutional approaches to 
democratic quality, it does not use all of the variables listed above.  
The latter point stems both from the theoretical background of this thesis and 
from the nature of the QCA method. Since QCA requires a constant dialogue 
between variables and data, in order to ensure that there is enough variety 
amongst cases to derive a meaningful result, some variables may need to be added, 
replaced or excluded altogether. Furthermore, in QCA a balance needs to be found 
between the number of cases and number of variables. In general, the 
recommended number of variables for an intermediate-N set (10-40 cases) is 4-6 
(Rhioux and Ragin, 2009) 
With this in mind, in the following sections I will explain the adjustments I have 
made to Buhlmann’s model and then present a working list of variables that could 
potentially be used in the analysis.  
 
3.1.3. Adjusting the model 
In the course of preparing data for my analysis based on Buhlmann’s model, I have 
identified several problems with two of the variables he proposes – HDI and 
globalization. In the following section I give a detailed overview of these problems, 
discuss possible solutions and consider the inclusion of corruption as an additional 
condition.   
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a. HDI and the problem of resource distribution 
First, as previously explained, HDI is problematic particularly because it is difficult 
to discern whether it is a condition or an outcome of higher democratic standards. 
However, HDI also poses a methodological problem in the context of this study, in 
that it does not effectively reflect resource distribution. As of 2011, its income 
component is measured as a country’s per capita purchasing power-adjusted gross 
national income (GNI)7. While GDP and GNI measure different aspects of a 
country’s economy, they are related. GDP is the monetary value of goods and 
services produced in a country irrespective of how much is retained in the country. 
GNI represents the income of a country’s residents, including part of its 
international flows, and excluding income generated in the country but repatriated 
abroad8. Thus, GNI is essentially calculated by adding the net income from abroad 
(including dividends, interest and profit) to GDP. As such, even if HDI data based 
on GNI were available prior to 2011, including HDI as a measure of human 
development alongside GDP/capita as a measure of economic prosperity would 
mean that, in effect, GDP/capita is present in two of the six variables that 
Buhlmann proposes to use.  
Further, while the most recent UNDP reports on HDI argue that GNI gives a better 
picture of economic development, they also acknowledge that it is not a good 
representation of resource distribution. For this reason the 2010 Human 
Development Report introduced a new index - the inequality adjusted-HDI (IHDI). 
Methodologically, IHDI accounts for inequalities inside HDI’s three dimensions by 
discounting each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. 
HDI and IHDI take identical values under conditions of perfect equality, but IHDI 
falls under HDI as inequality rises. Thus, IHDI expresses a country’s actual level of 
human development, while the HDI expresses its potential level9. From this, it is 
clear that replacing HDI with IHDI in the analysis would be preferable; but since no 
IHDI data is available prior to 2010, such a replacement is not possible.  
                                                          
7
 Previously expressed as purchasing power adjusted GDP/capita. See Technical Note 2. A Human 
Development Index by Income Groups (2006) 
8
 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) about the Human Development Index (2011) 
9
 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) 
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However, we are still left with the dilemma of accounting for resource distribution. 
Perhaps the most widely used option for this is the Gini coefficient of inequality, 
which is an indicator of statistical dispersion with values between 0 (complete 
equality – resources are evenly distributed) and 100 (complete inequality – all 
resources are owned by one individual or group). Of course, the Gini coefficient 
has its own disadvantages, in that it reflects income distribution without 
accounting for social structure, and is not additive across groups, so that a society 
overall Gini coefficient is not equal to the sum of the coefficients of different sub-
groups10. Furthermore, as a measurement it is less complex than HDI, because it 
completely excludes the dimensions of health and education.  
Nevertheless in my analysis I have chosen to use the Gini coefficient instead of HDI 
not only because it offers a viable solution to the two problems outlined above, but 
also because HDI’s other two dimensions do not vary significantly across the ten 
CEECs.  Based on 2005-2010 projections by the United Nations11, life expectancy at 
birth, which reflects HDI’s health dimension, varies between 71.4 years (Estonia) 
and 77.9 years (Slovenia). Similarly, there is little variation in school life 
expectancy, which is one of the measures of HDI’s education dimensions. 
According to the CIA World Factbook12, Bulgaria has the lowest school life 
expectancy (14 years) and Slovenia the highest (17 years). As such, we can expect 
any significant variation within the sample to be caused by HDI’s income 
dimension. 
 
b. Globalization and the problem of measurement thresholds 
Buhlmann adopts as a measurement for his globalization dimension of democratic 
quality the Globalization Index calculated yearly by the KOF Swiss Economic 
Institute (Dreher, 2006). This index, introduced in 2002, defines globalization as a 
process of creating a complex system of links between long-distance actors, 
                                                          
10
 Measuring Inequality, World Bank’s Web Site on Inequality, Poverty, and Socio-economic 
Performance  
11
 United Nations World Population Prospects – 2006 Revision 
12
 School Life Expectancy, CIA World Factbook 
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mediated by economic, social and informational flows. It accounts for three 
dimensions: 
- economic globalization, measured through international flows of goods, 
services, capital and market-related information 
- political globalization, expressed as a diffusion of government policies 
- social globalization, characterized by the wide-spreading of people, ideas, 
information and images.  
A set of sub-indices is also calculated in relation to the KOF Index of Globalization, 
focusing on actual economic flows (trade and foreign investment), economic 
restrictions, personal contacts and cultural proximity. Scale-wise, the higher the 
value of the KOF index, the more globalized a country is.  
The complexity and wide coverage of this index no doubt lends valuable input to 
the analysis model. Furthermore, there is wide theoretical support for the positive 
influence that a network of global flows and contacts can have on a country’s 
democracy. Way and Levitsky (2007) explain for instance how the interplay of 
international leverage and linkage has helped the process of democratization in 
the post-communist space. Their concept of linkage in particular is very similar to 
the KOF index’s definition of globalization: a density of cross-border ties 
(economic, geographic, social, political, diplomatic and organizational) and flows 
(of goods, services, people, capital and information). Their main argument is that 
linkage functions as a medium for transmitting international influence, which in 
general tends to have a positive impact on democratization in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
However, while Way and Levitsky primarily discuss international linkage in the 
context of democratization, rather than democratic quality, it certainly does not 
mean that the the presence of globalization/linkage should be discounted in more 
firmly established democracies. A quick examination of Table 3.1 below, showing 
recent trends in the KOF Index of Globalization in the EU’s newest members 
reveals that all but one have become more globalized since 200413.  In the case of 
                                                          
13 The situation is slightly different in the case of Romania and Bulgaria if we consider their evolution 
post-accession. For Bulgaria the KOF index has increased only slightly after 2007, while for Romania, it 
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Poland, the only country showing a negative trend, the decrease is small enough to 
be practically insignificant.  
  Table 3.1. KOF Index of Globalization trends for CEECs 
GLOBALIZATION 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND 
Bulgaria 69,2 67,73 71,41 75,07 74,42 72,5 75,41 75,12 5,92 
Czech Rep. 84,62 85,4 85,34 86,48 86 85,76 86,87 86,33 1,71 
Estonia 77,17 77,29 78,65 79,58 79,86 79,34 79,49 80,22 3,05 
Hungary 84,62 85,29 86,57 86,9 86,9 87,37 87 87,62 3 
Latvia 67,45 68,29 70,2 70,64 69,85 66,26 71,61 70,32 2,87 
Lithuania 64,93 66,31 67,31 68,85 69,79 66,56 74,73 73,64 8,71 
Poland 79,72 78,17 79,96 81 79,73 80,81 81,26 79,66 -0,06 
Romania 65,11 67 66,61 75,87 75,31 74,94 71,51 71,25 6,14 
Slovakia 80,62 82,35 83,41 83,85 84,05 83,83 85,07 85,3 4,68 
Slovenia 75,97 75,77 76,94 79,05 79,37 77,66 78,78 79,88 3,91 
Source: KOF Globalization Index reports 2004-2011 
The problem with choosing to either keep or discard Globalization as an 
independent variable in this study is not as much theoretical as it is 
methodological. Firstly, the KOF index trend does not change direction across nine 
of the ten cases, which means that for these it should be given a value of (1) when 
transforming Globalization into a dichotomous variable. Secondly, there is a wide 
discrepancy between those values to be coded as (1), some of which show a 
significant increase, and the one value to be coded (0), which reflects a very small 
decrease across the entire period.  This leaves us with the dilemma of a 
dichotomous variable that does not, apparently, vary.  
Rhioux and De Meur (2009) recommend that, in cases where coding dichotomous 
variables proves problematic, a certain threshold be defined to ensure that there is 
enough variation among the values to justify the inclusion. Ideally, defining such a 
threshold should be based on substantive theoretical support. Where this is not 
possible, more technical criteria can be defined (for instance, the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
has actually decreased. However, for methodological reasons previously explained, this study takes 
into account the entire 2004-2011 period for all ten countries.  
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cases on a continuum) or, as a last resort, some mechanical cut-offs based on 
specific values.  
Nevertheless, it is rare that theory gives particular rules to help create 
dichotomizing thresholds for such indexes. In the case of the KOF index of 
globalization, the situation is even more complicated, as it is not as easy to define a 
technical threshold as it is in for other continuous variables. For instance, the type 
of case distribution that Rhioux and De Meur recommend is readily identifiable for 
GDP/capita, inflation and the Gini coefficient by taking the EU-27 cumulated values 
for these variables as reference where necessary.14 Since such data is readily 
available, applying the threshold is relatively straightforward. But no similar data 
is currently available for the KOF index, so that the same method cannot be 
applied. This leaves us with the option of defining some type of artificial threshold, 
that is neither theoretically nor methodologically justifiable, and therefore quite 
problematic.  
This is the reason I have chosen to leave Globalization out of my analysis. Unlike 
HDI, there is enough theoretical support to make globalization a potentially 
valuable condition in a QCA-based study. However, the decision to exclude it 
hinges precisely on QCA technicalities. Had there been more variety among cases 
at the onset, the variable could have been included without the need to define a 
threshold. Since this is not the case, and a viable threshold cannot be defined 
under current conditions, it is better to exclude Globalization from QCA. Another 
reason for this is that QCA requires the use of a manageable number of variables, 
and one important landmark in preparing this analysis has been to supplement 
Buhlmann’s model with a variable that occupies a special position in relation to 
CEECs – corruption.  
There is, of course, no theoretical trade-off between corruption and globalization 
to justify replacing one with the other, and indeed, I do not suggest that this is a 
replacement, but simply the inclusion of one variable at the expense of another. In 
addition to the problems I have discussed previously, the KOF index of 
globalization may be able to tell us less about how CEE democracies varied than 
                                                          
14
 Further details on the operationalization of each variable follow in Chapter 4.  
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the role of the EU. All of this makes globalization an unlikely candidate to be used 
in QCA here, which is why I have excluded it and added corruption instead.  
All the same, I recognize that completely discounting the impact of globalization on 
democratic quality limits the complexity of this study somewhat. Without 
globalization or the role of the EU, we are left trying to explain democratic quality 
in CEECs by examining only domestic variables. Nonetheless, due to the limited 
scope of this thesis and the nature of the case sample, I have chosen to focus 
primarily on the EU’s role.  
 
c. Corruption weighing in 
Corruption is relevant to this model in two ways. Firstly, it is theoretically related 
to the concept of democracy outlined in the latter part of Chapter 3. It relates not 
only to the rule of law, but also comes to affect the spheres of accountability and 
legitimacy. It is evident at the intersection of public and private spheres, 
particularly in areas not subject to binding rules (Della Porta and Meny, 1997). 
However, corruption is not a phenomenon exclusively related to governments. 
Moreno (2003) argues that its origins are embedded into political culture, 
whereby the widespread acceptance of corrupt practices is inherently 
undemocratic.  
The second reason why corruption is relevant to this model rests on empirical 
observations pertaining to CEECs.  
Researchers like Moreno see corruption in CEECs as the legacy of communism,  On 
the contrary, Kos (2006) argues that, if corruption today was simply inherited 
from the communist systems, we would be dealing with a “season of corruption” 
that can be expected to gradually fade as transition towards democracy is 
achieved. As several studies show, this was not the case.  
Corruption has proven a prevalent problem throughout the accession process of 
CEECs, most notably in Romania and Bulgaria. There are also indications that it 
has to some extent remained so after accession (Ionita et al., 2011; Bulanova, 
2008, Racovita, 2011). Further, at the level of political culture, Moreno identifies a 
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strong negative correlation between corruption permissiveness and support for 
democracy in post-communist countries. This trend has not only failed to diminish 
with the advance of democratization, but it has, in some cases, increased.  
Thus, corruption may then be able to give us an insight into why democratc quality 
evolved the way it did in CEECs post-accession. This input is doubly valuable, as it 
can be related to both institutional aspects and the wider sphere of political 
culture.  
 
3.1.4. Summary 
In this section, I explained how I approached the design of my research model. At 
this point, I should also explain that the final model suits the aims of this thesis in 
three respects. First of all, it comprises of a manageable number of variables (six in 
total, but it is possible that not all will be used in the final analysis). Secondly, it is 
not designed to identify types of democracies, but to explain how and why they 
vary within these types. Finally, it covers two major explanations for this variation 
– economic/developmental and institutional. The former is reflected in indicators 
that form part of Merkel’s spheres of external embeddedness. The latter are 
institutional variables and, depending on the final results, may be able to tell us 
something about how the logic of internal embeddedness works for the sample 
cases.  
Finally, Table 3.2 gives a summary of the model, cases, reference period and 
methods used.  
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Table 3.2 Summary of the research model 
CASES Bulgaria (BUL), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), 
Latvia (LAT), Lithuania (LIT), Poland (POL), Romania (ROM), Slovakia 
(SVK), Slovenia (SVN) 
TIME FRAME 2004-2011 
 
OUTCOME Quality of Democracy (DEM) 
 
CONDITIONS 
(DOMESTIC) 
GDP/capita (GDP), human development index (HDI), inflation (INF), 
parliamentary system (PARL), PR electoral system (PR), corruption 
(COR) 
 
CONDITIONS 
(INTERNATIONAL) 
The role of the EU, globalization 
 
 
METHOD csQCA – domestic conditions 
Literature-based discussion – international conditions 
 
 
The following section explains the principles and practices of QCA, motivates the 
choice of method and lists the specific analysis steps to be followed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2. AN OVERVIEW OF QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (QCA) 
 
3.2.1. Qualitative versus quantitative and the dilemma of small-N 
sets  
In the early stages of my research, I considered focusing on two cases – Bulgaria 
and Romania – and conducting a comparative case study to examine whether it is 
39 | P a g e  
 
possible to identify certain patterns in how and why democracy declined in the 
EU’s newest member states. The two cases show some obvious similarities: both 
are former communist countries that were part of the same wave of enlargement 
and whose accession was considered somewhat problematic. However, to suggest 
that the conditions which had an impact on the quality of democracy in these two 
countries can be extended to the entire group of CEECs leads to potentially faulty 
generalizations. Such inferences may still become possible by studying a larger 
number of cases, but due to limited scope of this thesis, a sufficiently detailed 
analysis of more than two or three countries would become difficult. 
The alternative of using quantitative analysis would admittedly make it easier to 
explain causal relationships between variables. More so, it would allow us to 
identify specific degrees to which different independent variables affect the 
outcome. However, in the context of this study, it also poses a major difficulty: 
while the number of cases here is too large to allow a detailed qualitative study, 
the fact that there are at most ten CEEC members to work with also means that the 
number is too small to allow reliable causal inferences based, for instance, on 
linear regression. Thus, we are left with the problem of finding a method that 
accommodates both causal inferences and a small number of cases.  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), introduced by Charles Ragin in 1987, is 
one such method. Unlike its name suggests, QCA is not purely qualitative, but is 
intended to operate as a middle way between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. Its logical foundation rest on Mill’s method of agreement and method 
of difference (1868), which both attempt to find causal relations by matching or 
contrasting cases. Additionally, it draws on Mill’s indirect method of difference, 
whereby if two cases exhibiting a common characteristic show the same outcome, 
while two cases where the same outcome does not occur differ by that same 
characteristic, then this is the cause, or an essential component of the cause for 
said outcome. However, Mill’s methods, while undoubtedly valuable, are intended 
to establish a rigid form of causal relationship, where one common cause explains 
the phenomenon, and all others are eliminated (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009) 
QCA is a holistic approach based on the assumption that more than one sufficient 
condition can be found to explain an outcome, unlike in the case of additive 
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methods used in quantitative analysis (linear regression, for example, where the 
equation describes a single explanation for the outcome, regardless of how the 
values are distributed among variables.) It is a method predominantly oriented 
towards understanding cases, which are perceived as a collection of analytically 
relevant characteristics chosen on the basis of theoretical literature. Its purpose is 
to explain the relation between one characteristic described as the outcome (the 
dependent variable) and others described as conditions (independent variables). 
Unlike quantitative analysis though, QCA uses principles of Boolean algebra to 
conceptualize this relation as a set relation rather than a correlation. 
Ragin (1987) identifies five ways in which the Boolean approach functions as a 
“middle way” between quantitative and qualitative research. Firstly, the number of 
cases is not a major consideration, as cases which display the same conditions can 
be grouped together. Secondly, unlike quantitative methods, which begin by 
assuming maximum simplicity, the Boolean approach starts by allowing multiple 
patterns of interaction, which are then simplified logically. Thirdly, through data 
reduction, the Boolean approach can produce logically minimal (parsimonious) 
solutions based on different combinations of conditions that lead to a particular 
outcome. Fourthly, the Boolean approach combines holistic and analytical 
approaches in that it allows for cases, treated as combinations of various 
characteristics, to be analyzed as wholes or as parts. Finally, the Boolean approach 
allows us to evaluate different explanations for the same outcome.  
 
3.2.2. Principles and basic concepts in QCA  
This section gives a detailed overview of the principles and basic concepts of QCA, 
as outlined by Charles Ragin in The Comparative Method (1987) and later works 
(2000, 2008) further expanded by Rhioux and Ragin (2009) and Wagemann and 
Schneider (2010). Briefly, QCA is meant to identify the most parsimonious solution 
that explains a certain outcome, while still allowing for some degree of causal 
complexity. It is based on several general principles.  
First, equifinality (multiple conjunctural causation) means that there is more than 
one set of conditions that leads to the same outcome. Further, it is possible that a 
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single condition is neither necessary nor sufficient, but plays an essential causal 
role in combination with other conditions (conjunctural causation.) Unlike in 
quantitative analysis, conditions do not compete against eachother to show which 
explains a greater proportion of the outcome. Rather the different combinations of 
conditions can act as alternatives to one another. In adopting equifinality, QCA also 
rejects the notion that there is some form of permanent causality (Ragin, 1987, 
Rhioux and De Meur, 2009). In other words, where quantitative analysis aims to 
specify a single model that best fits the data, QCA is geared towards finding and 
explaining the nature of several different models that can be observed among the 
cases.  
Secondly, causal asymmetry refers to the fact that the explanation for a certain 
outcome does not automatically mean that the inverted explanation implies the 
absence of the outcome. This is why the presence and the absence of the outcome 
are typically examined separately.   
Finally, modest generalization means that QCA can be used to support what Ragin 
refers to as “limited historical generalization”: from a certain number of 
comparable cases, it is possible to make inferences that can then be applied to 
other cases that share a sufficient number of characteristics.   
To proceed with QCA, it is necessary that the cases, outcome and sets of conditions 
be identified prior to the analysis. During this initial phase, Ragin recommends 
that we learn as much as possible about positive cases (those for which the 
outcome is true). On this basis, we can select negative cases, where we may 
assume that the outcome will not happen. Both of these constitute the relevant set 
of cases for the analysis.  
After all these elements have been identified, the conditions and the outcome are 
given numeric values. QCA uses binary data - a value of (1) means that the 
condition or outcome is present for a certain case, while a value of (0) indicates its 
absence. Thus, both dependent and independent variables need to have nominal-
scale measures. Where this is not the case from the onset, interval-scale measures 
are transformed into multi-categorical nominal scale measures. Since social data is 
usually quite complex, we can expect this to result in some loss of information. 
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However, this loss is not very significant, because many phenomena that may be 
analyzed comparatively already have causes and outcomes expressed as nominal 
scale measures. (Ragin, 1987) 
Once variables have been operationalized, QCA uses “truth tables” to present data. 
The idea of these tables is that, once binary data has been collected, it becomes 
easy to sort based on different combinations of conditions. Each possible 
combination is represented on a single row and, once all combinations are sorted, 
each row is assigned an outcome value (also expressed in binary terms) based on 
its combination. 
Additionally, truth tables have as many rows as there are logically possible 
combinations of conditions so, for instance, in a study where four conditions are 
identified, the truth table will have 24 = 16 rows. It is worth mentioning at this 
point that not all rows in a truth table may have corresponding empirical cases. 
The table contains all possible logical combinations of conditions, some of which 
may not be characteristic of any observed cases. These are called logical 
remainders and may sometimes be used to achieve more parsimony in solutions 
(Rhioux and De Meur, 2009). 
Two additional concepts are useful in understanding how QCA works: Boolean 
addition and multiplication. Unlike simple arithmetic addition, Boolean addition 
operates with the kind of binary data obtained during the first stages of the 
analysis, considering it in terms of the presence or absence of conditions and 
outcomes. So, for instance, if A + B = X, where A and B are two conditions and X is 
the outcome, then if A = 1 and B = 1, X = 1. Boolean addition corresponds to the 
logical operator OR, so the above is equivalent to ‘if condition A is present OR 
condition B is present, then the outcome X will occur.’ 
Boolean multiplication is also significantly different from arithmetic 
multiplication, and is essential to QCA because it allows expressions known as 
sums of products to be simplified. Its logical correspondent is AND. Thus, if the 
presence of conditions A, B and C is noted with uppercase letters, and their 
absence with lowercase letters, then the formula Abc +ABc + aBc + ABc = X is 
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equivalent to ‘if any of these combinations of the presence/absence of conditions 
occurs, then the outcome X occurs.’ 
Both these operations are used for the purpose of Boolean minimization, whereby 
we are able to simplify complex, primitive sums of products such as the one above 
into parsimonious solutions. Briefly, minimization lets us take two expressions 
that differ only by one term, and produce a simpler solution. For example, Abc and 
ABc can be combined to produce Ac. Similarly, aBc and ABc can be combined to 
produce Bc. Finally, the two resulting, simpler expressions Ac and Bc can be 
combined to produce c. Thus, we have reduced a complex expression to a very 
simple one. The formula above (‘if any of these combinations of the 
presence/absence of conditions occurs, then the outcome X occurs’) becomes: ‘if 
the absence of condition C occurs, the outcome X occurs.’ 
An additional concept related to minimization is implication. Implicants are terms 
that cover (imply) several expressions in the truth table. For instance, A covers 
both Abc and ABc, in which case it is called a prime implicant. Briefly, the use of 
implicants is to cover as many expressions as possible with a minimal number of 
conditions, thus aiding in the process of achieving parsimony.  
Finally, and in relation to the above features, QCA operates within the framework 
of necessity and sufficiency. This means that, for instance, if condition A is always 
present when a certain outcome occurs, then it is a necessary condition for that 
outcome. Sufficiency refers to whether or not A can by itself produce the outcome. 
If A always appears to cause the outcome in combination with other conditions, 
then it is necessary, but not sufficient.   
There are two types of QCA15: crisp-set (csQCA) and fuzzy-set (fsQCA). The former 
is the version initially developed by Ragin in the 1980s and detailed above. The 
main idea of crisp sets is that an element either belongs to a set, or it does not (i.e., 
a condition/outcome either occurs or it does not). Fuzzy sets allow for partial 
membership, with membership values that vary from (0) to (1) but do not 
necessarily take dichotomous values. Concepts of necessity, sufficiency and 
                                                          
15
 A third type, multi-value QCA (mvQCA) has been developed in the 2000s, which allows multi-nominal 
concepts (Cronqvist, 2005) 
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conjunctural causation are common to both csQCA and fsQCA, but some 
procedures are not. Wagemann and Schneider (2010) explain that csQCA is 
actually a special case of fsQCA, so while operations of Boolean algebra 
characteristic to csQCA are applicable to both, fsQCA uses fuzzy set algebra.  
While apparently stricter, csQCA also has the advantage of clarity when it comes to 
preparing and presenting data. In this thesis, I use csQCA and work with two of the 
software programs most widely currently: fsQCA (Ragin and Drass, 2006 – also 
allows full csQCA operations) and TOSMANA (Cronqvist, 2005). 
 
3.2.3. Suitability for the study and stages of analysis 
csQCA suits this study primarily because it allows the examination of a small 
number of cases without necessarily sacrificing complexity. Furthermore, it is a 
method well equipped for extrapolating an answer for a wide research question 
(in this case, what are the conditions that influenced the evolution of democratic 
quality in CEECs post-accession) based on relatively limited data. Finally, it 
presents data and results in a clear and comprehensive way, which nevertheless 
leaves room for a more complex discussion and interpretation.  
The analysis itself is designed in three stages: 
1. Variable operationalization: presents the definition, data, dichotomization 
and discussion of possible specific issues for each variable 
2. Truth tables and primitive solutions: presents and discusses the truth table, 
as well as primitive (non-simplified) solutions for both the presence and 
the absence of the outcome obtained with fsQCA and TOSMANA (in this 
case, the increase or decline of democratic theory). The final product of this 
stage is logical minimization, where the most parsimonious solution for 
both the presence and the absence of the outcome are identified.  
3. Interpretation of results: a discussion of conditions that occur in the final 
solution, as well as of possible further applications of the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter contains the main part of the analysis. It is structured in three parts, 
as follows: 
In Part one, I explain how each variable was operationalized and dichotomized. 
This includes the definition, measurements, thresholds and hypothesis specific to 
each variable. The final dichotomous data table is presented at the end of this first 
step. In Part two, I construct a truth table using the fsQCA and TOSMANA software 
and check for potentially problematic configurations. I then present two sets of 
primitive solutions – for the presence and the absence of the outcome respectively 
– and proceed with logical minimization. Then I discuss the QCA results. Finally, in 
Part three, I discuss the EU’s influence on post-accession democratic quality.  
A preliminary note on dichotomizing variables: as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, one particular concern in QCA when transforming continuous variables 
into dichotomous ones is to ensure that there is some variety among values. A 
condition that has the same values across the entire set of cases may not be as 
relevant as one which has more variety among (1) and (0) values. For this reason, I 
use the following general guidelines when dichotomizing variables: 
 for variables that are already dichotomous from the beginning, assigning 
(1) and (0) values is done in accordance to standard QCA practices, to 
indicate the presence and absence of that condition respectively; 
 for continuous variables, trends are observed for each case by subtracting 
the 2004 value from the 2011 value, and the frequency of assigned (1) and 
(0) values is examined. Since we are dealing with only ten cases in total, for 
those conditions where there are at least three different values from the 
rest of the set, (1) and (0) values will remain as they are.16 Where 
                                                          
16 There is no clear definition in QCA of what variety among cases means, so this rule is set on 
technical grounds specific to this study and based on preliminary observations of data. A minimum 
of three different cases out of ten occur in all continuous variables, so that using this as a general 
dichotomization rule would reduce arbitrariness when assigning (1) and (0) values to variables 
that are measured in vastly different ways.  
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necessary, the total values for EU27 are used to determine dichotomization 
thresholds.  
 
4.1. EXPLAINING THE VARIABLES 
4.1.1 The outcome: democratic quality (DEM) 
The outcome (dependent variable) is the quality of democracy. As mentioned in 
previous chapters, there are currently several ways of measuring the state of 
democracy in the world, ranging from minimal to complex coverage of the concept. 
It is important to keep in mind that the focus of these indicators is to place 
countries along a democracy – authoritarianism continuum, rather than work with 
the idea of democratic quality. However, due to both data availability and the 
necessity of a clear measurement, this thesis uses one such index, which has the 
additional advantage of focusing specifically on CEECs.  
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports measure the evolution of democracy 
in 29 countries spanning from Central Europe to Central Asia. The Democracy 
Score is compiled on the basis of intermediate indicators covering seven 
components of democratic rule. These are: national and local democratic 
governance, the electoral process, civil society, independent media, judicial 
framework and independence, and corruption.17 
Thus, national democratic governance accounts for the character and stability of 
the government, as well as the independence and accountability of the executive 
and legislative branches. Local democratic governance focuses on the 
decentralization of power, and the responsibilities, accountability and 
transparency of local authorities. The electoral process refers to national executive 
and legislative elections, political participation and the development of multiparty 
systems. Civil society examines the presence, capacity and financial sustainability 
of non-governmental organizations, as well as the legal framework they operate in. 
It includes the development of free trade unions and interest group participation 
                                                          
17 Nations in Transit Methodology (2011) 
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in policy-making. Independent media considers the state of press freedom, the 
emergence of a financially viable private press and the extent of citizens’ internet 
access. Judicial framework and independence include compliance with judicial 
decisions, the protection of human rights, equality before the law, constitutional 
reforms, judicial independence, ethnic minority rights and the treatment of 
suspects and prisoners. Finally, corruption evaluates public perceptions of 
corruption, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest and the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives.  
The score is measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 signifies the highest level of 
democratic progress (consolidated democracy) and 7, the lowest (consolidated 
authoritarian regime). Additionally, the ratings are based on a quarter-point scale, 
where minor to moderate positive/negative changes may result in a quarter-point 
(0.25) shift in the score, while significant positive/negative changes may warrant a 
half-point (0.50) shift. However, changes of more than half a point in a single year 
are rare.  
Table 4.1 below lists the Democracy Score values for CEECs between 2004 and 
2011. 
Table 4.1. NIT Democracy Score trends and coding 
DEM 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND
18
 CODED 
BUL 3.25 3.18 2.93 2.89 2.86 3.04 3.04 3.07  -0.18 1 
CZE 2.33 2.29 2.25 2.25 2.14 2.18 2.21 2.18 -0.15 1 
EST 1.92 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.93 1.93 1.96 1.93 0.01 0 
HUN 1.96 1.96 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.29 2.39 2.61 0.65 0 
LAT 2.17 2.14 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.18 2.18 2.14 -0.03 1 
LIT 2.13 2.21 2.21 2.29 2.25 2.29 2.25 2.25 0.12 0 
POL 1.75 2.00 2.14 2.36 2.39 2.25 2.32 2.21 0.46 0 
ROM 3.58 3.39 3.39 3.29 3.36 3.36 3.46 3.43 -0.15 1 
SVK 2.08 2.00 1.96 2.14 2.29 2.46 2.68 2.54 0.46 0 
SVN 1.75 1.68 1.75 1.82 1.86 1.93 1.93 1.93 0.18 0 
Source: Nations in Transit 2011 
                                                          
18 Note that because of the way the Democracy Score is measured, a negative trend 
indicates an improvement, while a positive trend signifies a drop in the score.  
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Dichotomization is relatively straightforward in this case: four out of ten countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia and Romania) show an increase in democratic 
quality over the entire period. Thus, the values for these countries are coded (1), 
while all others are coded (0). It is also worth noting that three countries in the list 
(Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) show significant democratic decline (a shift over 
or close to 0.50). On the other hand, in countries where democratic quality has 
improved, the changes are minor.  
 
4.1.2. GDP/capita (GDP) 
This indicator is an expression of economic wealth, reflected in the value of all 
goods and services produced in a country over a given period. Based on Lipset’s 
claim (1981) that wealthy countries are more likely to develop a high-quality 
democratic regime, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: A positive (upward) GDP/capita trend is likely to produce an 
improvement in the quality of democracy; conversely, a negative (downward) 
GDP/capita trend is likely produce a deterioration of democratic quality. 
It is important to keep in mind that because we are dealing with a set of countries, 
rather than individual cases, GDP/capita should be expressed in a single unit of 
measurement. For this reason, I have chosen to use data collected from Eurostat, 
which measures the evolution of GDP/capita in PPS (purchasing power standard – 
a common currency that eliminates price differences) for each of the ten countries, 
expressed in relation to an average EU-27 value set to 100. In other words, values 
lower than 100 indicate lower-than-average GDP/capita, and vice-versa. Table 4.2 
below shows the values for this indicator between 2004 and 2011, as well as its 
trend for each country.  
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Table 4.2. GDP/capita trends and coding 
GDP 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND CODED 
BUL 35 37 38 40 44 44 44 45 10 1 
CZE  78 79 80 83 81 82 80 80 2 0 
EST 57 62 66 70 69 64 64 67 10 1 
HUN 63 63 63 62 64 65 65 66 3 0 
LAT 46 48 51 56 56 51 55 58 12 1 
LIT 51 53 56 59 61 55 57 62 11 1 
POL 51 51 52 54 56 61 63 65 14 1 
ROM 34 35 38 42 47 47 47 49 15 1 
SVK 57 60 63 68 73 73 73 73 16 1 
SVN 87 87 88 88 91 87 85 84 -3 0 
Source: Eurostat 
The dichotomization procedure is somewhat technical, as there is no theoretical 
support for a precise cut-off point that may help determine how values should be 
separated. Nevertheless, by examining the data, we can observe the following: all 
values remain under the EU-27 average for the entire period. Slovenia is the only 
country that has maintained high GDP/capita values, but it is also the only country 
that shows a negative trend over the entire time-frame. This, together with the 
hypothesis, gives us a point of departure – the value for Slovenia can be coded as 
(0). The other cases are somewhat less straightforward, as they all show positive 
trends. If we consider the rule pertaining to data variety, setting the cut-off point 
at 10 gives us three cases to be coded (0), while all other values equal to or higher 
than 10 will be coded (1) 
 
4.1.3. Inflation (INFL) 
As Buhlmann suggests, inflation can be used to express countries’ ability to deal 
with economic crises. It is not necessarily the most complex measurement, but it is 
useful, as it reflects fluctuations in the price levels of consumer goods and services. 
Based on Buhlmann’s model, I use the following hypothesis:   
H2: A negative (downward) inflation trend is likely to produce an 
improvement in the quality of democracy; conversely, a positive (upward) 
inflation trend is likely to produce a deterioration of democratic quality.  
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As with GDP/capita, we need a single unit of measurement to apply to the entire 
group of countries. This is the harmonized index of consumer prices (HCIP), an 
indicator of inflation calculated by the European Central Bank across all EU 
countries. Table 4.3 shows the data for this indicator. 
Table 4.3. Inflation trends and coding 
INFL 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND CODED 
BUL 6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 12 2.5 3.00 3.4 -2.7 1 
CZE 2.6 1.6 2.1 3.0 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 -0.5 1 
EST 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.6 0.2 2.7 5.1 2.1 0 
HUN 6.8 3.5 4.0 7.9 6.00 4.0 4.7 3.9 -2.9 1 
LAT 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15.3 3.3 -1.2 4.2 -2.0 1 
LIT 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 4.1 2.9 0 
POL 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.7 3.9 0.3 0 
ROM 11.9 9.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 -6.1 1 
SVK 7.5 2.8 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 -3.4 1 
SVN 3.7 2.5 2.5 3.8 5.5 0.9 2.1 2.1 -1.6 1 
Source: Eurostat 
Here, dichotomization is again quite straightforward. There are three countries 
where inflation has increased over time: Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, so these 
countries receive a value of (0), while all others are coded (1).  
 
4.1.4. The Gini coefficient (GINI) 
This is an index of statistical dispersion which expresses the degree of income 
distribution inequality. It is measured on a scale of 0 (complete equality, all income 
is evenly distributed) and 100 (complete inequality, all income is concentrated in 
the hands of one individual or group.) The correspondent hypothesis is: 
H3: A negative (downward trend) in the Gini coefficient is likely to produce an 
improvement in the quality of democracy; conversely, a positive (upward) 
trend in the Gini coefficient is likely to result in a decline of democratic 
quality.  
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Table 4.4. Gini coefficient trends and coding 
GINI 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND CODED 
BUL 26 25 31.2 35.3 35.9 33.4 33.2 n/a 8.2 0 
CZE n/a 26 25.3 25.3 24.7 25.1 24.9 25.3 -1.1 1 
EST 37.4 34.1 33.1 33.4 30.9 31.4 31.3 n/a -2.8 1 
HUN n/a 27.6 33.3 25.6 25.2 24.7 24.1 n/a -3.5 1 
LAT n/a 36.1 39.2 35.4 37.7 37.4 36.1 35.2 0 0 
LIT n/a 36.3 35 33.8 34 35.5 36.9 n/a 0.6 0 
POL n/a 35.6 33.3 32.2 32 31.4 31.1 n/a -4.5 1 
ROM 31 31 33 37.8 36 34.9 33.3 33.2 2.3 0 
SVK n/a 26.2 28.1 24.5 23.7 24.8 25.9 n/a -0.3 1 
SVN n/a 23.8 23.7 23.2 23.4 22.7 23.8 23.8 0 0 
Source: Eurostat 
Here, the data for all but one case is incomplete, so in order to calculate a uniform 
trend, I consider a shorter time-frame, between 2005 and 2010. Dichotomization 
is simple, and there is again no need to use the EU values as a threshold: all cases 
which show a negative trend are coded (1), and all cases showing a positive or 
static trend are coded 0.  
 
4.1.5. Institutions (PARL and PR) 
The institutional component of the model yields the clearest indicators in terms of 
measurement and coding – parliamentary systems and PR electoral systems. The 
corresponding hypotheses are: 
H4: The presence of a parliamentary system is likely to encourage a better 
quality democracy; conversely, the absence of a parliamentary system is likely 
to foster a weaker democracy in terms of quality. 
H5: The presence of a PR electoral system is likely to encourage a better 
democracy; conversely, the absence of a PR electoral system is likely to foster 
a weaker democracy in terms of quality.  
Table 4.5 below lists each of the ten countries by government and electoral 
system: 
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Table 4.5. Institutions and coding 
INST PARL CODED PR CODED 
BUL Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
CZE Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
EST Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
HUN Parliamentary 1 Mixed 0 
LAT Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
LIT Semi-presidential 0 Parallel 0 
POL Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
ROM Semi-presidential 0 Mixed 0 
SVK Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
SVN Parliamentary 1 List PR 1 
Source: CIA World Factbook; the Electoral Knowledge Network 
Note that these are the only variables in the model that are already dichotomous 
and not expressed as time-series. Thus, the presence of a parliamentary system/a 
PR electoral system is coded (1), while the presence of any other type of 
government or electoral system is coded (0)19. 
 
4.1.6. Corruption perception index (COR) 
This is an index calculated yearly by Transparency International, which reflects 
the perceived level of corruption in a country, based on public opinion surveys. 
The corresponding hypothesis is: 
H6: A positive (upward) trend in corruption perception is likely to encourage 
an increase in democratic quality; conversely, a negative (downward) trend 
in corruption perception is likely to encourage a deterioration of democratic 
quality.  
                                                          
19 Being dichotomous, they are also the only variables for which it is impossible to adjust cases for 
variety, even though both show an obvious bias towards value (1). However, since they are 
essential to the overall model, reflecting an institutional approach to democratic quality, I have 
chosen to keep them in the analysis.  
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The corruption perception index is measured on a scale of 10 (very clean) to 0 
(very corrupt).  
Table 4.6. Corruption trends and coding 
COR 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TREND CODED 
BUL 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3 -0.8 0 
CZE 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.2 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.4 0.2 1 
EST 6.0 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.4 0.4 1 
HUN 4.8 5.0 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 4.7 4.6 -0.2 0 
LAT 4.0 4.2 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.2 0.2 1 
LIT 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.9 5.0 4.8 0.2 1 
POL 3.5 3.4 3.7 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.5 2.0 1 
ROM 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 0.7 1 
SVK 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.9 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.0 0.0 0 
SVN 6.0 6.1 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.4 5.9 -0.1 0 
Source: Transparency International 
In this case dichotomization can be achieved by using Gherghina’s method (2009) 
as is: positive trends are coded (1), while negative or static trends are coded (0). 
Thus, we have three cases that display negative trends and one which (Slovakia), 
which shows a static trend. These are coded (0), and all the rest are coded (1). 
Finally, after detailing each indicator, we can build the final dichotomous data 
table, which gives a synthetic presentation of data for both outcome and 
conditions in each case: 
Table 4.7. Dichotomous data table 
COUNTRY DEM GDP INFL GINI PARL PR COR 
BUL 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
CZE 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
EST 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
HUN 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
LAT 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
LIT 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
POL 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
ROM 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
SVK 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SVN 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
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Having compiled all necessary information, we can proceed to the next step in the 
analysis: the truth table, primitive solutions and logical minimization 
 
4.2. SOLUTION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.2.1. Solution 
Table 4.7A shows the configurations obtained using the TOSMANA software. 
Table 4.7A Truth table for Buhlmann’s model 
COUNTRY   GDP   INFL   GINI   PARL   PR   DEM   
BUL, LAT 1 1 0 1 1 1 
CZE 0 1 1 1 1 1 
EST, POL 1 0 1 1 1 0 
HUN 0 1 1 1 0 0 
LIT 1 0 0 0 0 0 
ROM 1 1 0 0 0 1 
SVK 1 1 1 1 1 0 
SVN 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 
The first observation derived from this truth table is that there are no 
contradictory configurations (identical combinations of conditions showing 
different outcomes.) This is fortunate not because contradictory combinations are 
problematic in themselves, but because they cannot be effectively used in Boolean 
minimization. Excluding these contradictions altogether may result in 
parsimonious solutions, but would also reduce solution coverage significantly 
(Hemann and Crongvist, 2006) 
While we do not need to worry about contradictions, the truth table still contains a 
problematic configuration: in Slovakia, all conditions favouring an improvement in 
democratic quality are present, but the outcome itself does not occur. Rhioux and 
De Meur (2009) suggest that the most common way to solve this type of issue is to 
either introduce or remove a condition. True enough, by including COR into the 
model, a (0) value appears for Slovakia. 
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Table 4.8 Truth table including COR 
COUNTRY   GDP   INFL   GINI   PARL   PR   COR   DEM   
BUL 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
CZE 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
EST, POL 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
HUN 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
LAT 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
LIT 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
ROM 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
SVK 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
SVN 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
 
Consequently, because COR contributes to the model by solving a counterintuitive 
configuration, the analysis is performed on Buhlmann’s model adjusted to include 
this condition. Additionally, due to QCA’s causal asymmetry, which I discussed in 
the previous chapter, the outcome (DEM) and its absence (an inversion of DEM, 
here noted DECL) are examined separately.  
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the most parsimonious solutions20 obtained with the 
fsQCA software for DEM and DECL respectively, complete with the exact cases they 
cover. As a general comment, raw coverage refers to the proportion of the solution 
which the expression covers, while unique coverage indicates the proportion that 
each individual case represents. The solution coverage refers to the overall 
coverage, not just that of each expression. As is evident from the tables, the 
solution covers all cases both for DEM and DECL. Additionally, there are no 
problems of consistency (a value of 1 indicates that all cases in the solution display 
the outcome. Ragin recommends that for data used in QCA, this should be at least 
0.8) 
 
                                                          
20 In order to obtain the most parsimonious solution with the fsQCA software, one should instruct 
the program to treat logical remainders (combinations of conditions with no corresponding 
empirical cases) as ‘Don’t cares’ (see Ragin, 2008). Depending on whether or not a satisfying degree 
of parsimony has been obtained, these logical remainders can be included in the analysis to 
improve the solution (as per Rhioux and De Meur, 2009) 
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Table 4.9 Solution for DEM 
SOLUTION RAW COVERAGE UNIQUE 
COVERAGE 
CONSISTENCY CASES 
INFL*COR 0.750000 0.250000 1.000000  CZE, LAT, 
ROM 
GDP*INFL*gini 0.250000 0.250000 1.000000  BUL 
Solution coverage: 1.000000  Solution consistency: 1.000000 
The solution for DEM shows that contries where the quality of democracy has 
improved are characterized by either a combination of declining inflation and 
declining corruption (Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania), or a combination of 
increasing GDP/capita, declining inflation and an increasing Gini coefficient.  
The latter component may appear problematic, as H3 indicates that an upward 
trend in the Gini coefficient is likely to result in the decline, rather than 
improvement of democratic quality. However, note that the  GDP*INFL*gini term 
only describes one case (Bulgaria), and that the solution can be further simplified by using 
the principles of logical minimization discussed in Chapter 3.  
Thus, the expression INFL*COR + GDP*INFL*gini → DEM becomes INFL → DEM. This 
means that improvement in democratic quality for our given sample can be 
explained by a declining inflation rate, which confirms H2.  
DECL is examined in a similar way: 
Table 4.10  Solution for DECL 
SOLUTION RAW COVERAGE UNIQUE 
COVERAGE 
CONSISTENCY CASES 
Infl 0.500000 0.500000 1.000000  EST, POL, LIT 
gdp*cor 0.333333 0.166667 1.000000  HUN, SVN 
cor*GINI 0.166667 0.166667 1.000000  SVK 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 solution consistency: 1.000000 
This tells us that the decline of democratic quality can be explained either by an 
increasing inflation rate, or a combination of declining GDP/capita and increasing 
corruption, or a combination of increasing corruption and decreasing Gini 
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coefficient. Again, the Gini coefficient appears to behave opposite to what its 
corresponding hypothesis indicates. Similarly to DEM though, the term cor*GINI 
only describes one case (Slovakia), and lends itself to further simplification.  
Because this solution contains three terms rather than two, logical minimization is 
done bottom-up: cor*GINI and gdp*cor are combined to result in cor. No further 
minimization is possible at this point, so the final solution is: cor + infl → DECL. This 
means that the decline of democratic quality for our given sample can be explained 
either by increasing corruption or by increasing inflation. Either H2 and H6 are 
thus confirmed.  
 
4.2.2. Interpretation of results 
Interestingly, inflation can by itself explain both the improvement and decline in 
democratic quality. This, of course, offers only a limited perspective on the matter, 
but it nevertheless draws attention to one hypothesis in Buhlmann’s original 
model: the quality of democracy in a country is dependent on that country’s ability 
to withstand economic shocks. In other words, the more stable the economy, the 
better the democracy.  
A cursory examination of data in table 4.3 may suggests that, in general, CEECs 
have been doing reasonably well, most of them managing a declining inflation 
trend over the 2004-2011 period. Nevertheless, looking at the same data in terms 
of fluctuations reveals a different story. Firstly, inflation peaked in 2008 in all ten 
CEECs and fell dramatically the following year, as a result of efforts to placate the 
impact of the economic and financial crisis. Secondly, while most countries in the 
list show declining inflation trends, their starting points are vastly different. For 
instance, Romania exhibits the strongest declining trend with -6.1 points, but 
despite this, continues to register the highest inflation rate of all the CEECs in 
2011, due in part to the fact that it had the highest starting point at 11.9 in 2004. 
The ECB Convergence Report for 2012 suggests that this tendency may continue: 
between 2011 and 2012, the reference value for price stability at the EU level was 
3.1, and only Bulgaria and Czech Republic registered average rates below this 
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point. Other CEECs, and most notably Romania, showed values well above the 
reference.  
The report also argues that the evolution of inflation should be viewed in the 
wider context of previous economic developments in CEECs: economic growth and 
stabilization inherent to the accession process, and convergence criteria related to 
entry into the Eurozone (for Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia). The latter in 
particular require that countries achieve a high level of price stability – meaning, 
in practice, that inflation rates must not be exceed the best three performing 
member states by more than 1.5 percentage points21.  
Indeed, Table 4.3 shows that, with the exception of 2008 these three countries 
have experienced relatively mild price fluctuations, compared to the rest. For 
those countries where inflation rates have risen over the reference period 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Poland) the yearly rates themselves and the fluctuations are 
quite small, with the exception of 2008. Additionally, Poland has the weakest 
overal trend in the list. Estonia shows higher inflation in 2011 compared to 2010, 
but this is most likely linked with switching to the Euro. 
All of this suggest that, in these countries, the inflation peak of 2008 may have had 
a stronger impact on the overall trend compared to the other cases in the sample. 
In other words, an overall greater price stability did not necessarily translate into 
declining inflation.  
As regards the role of inflation in improving democratic quality, several 
observations are in order. Czech Republic is the only country out of the four 
registering such an improvement where price fluctuations are consistently small – 
with the exception of 2008, there are no values higher than 3. Secondly, Latvia has 
higher inflation rates prior to 2007 and registers a significant rise between 2007 
and 2008, but immediately afterwards manages to bring and maintain price 
fluctuations under control. Out of the entire ten country sample, it is the only case 
that registers a negative inflation rate in 2010. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania both 
show overall high inflation and fluctuations, but have strong negative trends 
indicating significant improvement.  
                                                          
21
 See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l25014_en.htm 
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In short, where inflation contributed to a rising level of democratic quality, it did 
so in three ways: through small price fluctuations, the ability to bring rapidly 
rising inflation under control, and strong declining trends to compensate for 
overall high inflation.   
Corruption is slightly more straightforward to account for, but also reveals a 
problem of consistency. The solution for DECL shows that a negative corruption 
perception trend covers three countries: Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. Going 
back to Table 4.6 reveals that both Hungary and Slovenia do indeed show negative 
trends, while Slovakia registers no change over the reference period. However, 
where they occur, these shifts are very small (-0.2 for Hungary and -0.1 for 
Slovenia). This means that the behaviour of COR in this model is almost certianly 
dependent on how dichotomization was performed,  rather than on substantial 
empirical support. 
To be clear: this does not invalidate the solution identified for DECL. Firstly, the 
solution is consistent with the hypothesis – a negative (in this case, also static) 
trend in corruption perception is indeed linked to the decline of democratic 
quality. But because QCA does not, unlike regression analysis, allow us to 
determine the intensity of this link, it is difficult to estimate exactly how strong an 
explanation corruption gives for democratic quality decline. Secondly, the solution 
clearly indicates that there are two alternative explanations for DECL (rising 
inflation OR rising corruption). In connection to the previous observation, this 
would simply suggest that inflation may be a better candidate to explain the 
decline.  
Finally, an interesting point should be noted here. While logical minimization 
removes GINI from the final solution for both DEM or DECL, it remains the only 
condition present in the intermediate solutions to display an anomalous 
behaviour.  
There is no consistent explanation in literature for why this might be the case.  
However, one possible reason for GINI’s atypical behaviour may again result from 
the way it was operationalized in this study: the Gini coefficient is the only variable 
in the set for which incomplete data is available between 2004 and 2011. For 
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reasons of uniformity, I have calculated the trends based on the 2005-2010 time-
frame instead. The data in table 4.4 shows that, while countries such as Bulgaria, 
Estonia and Hungary display strong trends in one direction or another, two show 
weak trends (Lithuania and Slovakia), while two others (Latvia and Slovenia) 
show no change at all over the entire 2005-2011 period. All of these, with the 
exception of Slovenia, show value changes of more than one percentage point 
sometime during the period in question. This could suggest that, had data been 
available for 2004 and 2011, trends for these countries may have been different.  
Given the holistic nature of QCA, it is quite possible that, in a different exercise, an 
alternative operationalization of GINI may result in a normal behavious, or even in 
its complete absence from the solution. But since GINI is not part of the solution, 
such an exercise is irrelevant here.  
To summarize: in the sample of ten CEECs analyzed, the main explanation for both 
the improvement and the decline of democratic quality is primarily economic and 
rests on the impact of inflation. Corruption may offer an alternative explanation 
for decliing democratic quality, but re-examining the data suggests that it may not 
be as consistent as inflation. Finally, the Gini coefficient appears as part of the 
primitive solutions for both DEM and DECL, but behaves atypically, most likely due 
to being operationalized based on an incomplete data set. Applying logical 
minimization eliminates the Gini coefficient, so its anomalous behaviour does not 
affect the final solutions.  
In the end, two out of six conditions explain the outcomes for the overall sample. 
Both their corresponding hypotheses are corroborated, and a high degree of 
parsimony is achieved.  
 
4.2.3. Expanding the solution 
One particular issue with QCA, which Ragin calls modest generalization, is that 
inferences derived by applying this method to certain sets of cases are not always 
fully applicable outside those sets. In other words, my analysis of ten CEECs led me 
to conclude that either rising inflation or rising corruption explain the decline of 
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democratic quality in Central and Eastern Europe. Can the same solution explain 
decline in different circumstances? 
As previously mentioned, this set of ten CEECs carries in itself a particularity that 
cannot be eliminated without reducing the number of cases and implicitly affecting 
the coverage and significance of the study: Romania and Bulgaria became EU 
members in 2007, which means that, for approximately half of the reference 
period, they make a distinct sub-set among the other CEECs.  
For reasons of consistency, I have chosen to treat all cases in the same way 
throughout the analysis. However, this thesis’ main research question asks what 
the main factors that influenced post-accession quality of democracy in CEEC are. 
Up until this point, it would appear that I have addressed this only partially.  
In Chapter 1 I mentioned that if we consider the evolution of post-accession 
democratic quality for each of the ten countries, it becomes clear that only two – 
Czech Republic and Latvia – were able to improve their democracies somewhat 
since joining the EU. While Freedom House’s democracy score indicates that 
Romania and Bulgaria now have better democracies than in 2004, the situation 
changes quite significantly if we consider the 2007-2011 period instead: since 
accession, the trend has been decidedly downward.  
This observation offers a good opportunity to solve the two remaining issues in 
this analysis: testing the applicability of the solution found in the previous section, 
and identifying the factors that influenced democratic quality decline in these two 
countries.  
In other words: can either rising inflation or rising corruption explain the decline 
of democratic quality in Romania and Bulgaria after 2007? 
In Table 4.11 below, I reorganized the data for four out of the six previously used 
conditions22 to cover the 2007-2011 time-frame, and calculated the corresponding 
trends. The last two columns show the new trends and the old 2004-2011 trends 
respectively.  
                                                          
22
 PARL and PR remain the same, as they express static phenomena, not processes. 
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Since we are dealing with only two countries, a new, complete QCA analysis is not 
necessary. Data can be examined quite easily for each case.  
Table 4.11. Data on Bulgaria and Romania for 2007-2011 
DEM 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 NEW OLD 
BUL 2.89 2.86 3.04 3.04 3.07 0.18 -0.18 
ROM 3.29 3.36 3.36 3.46 3.43 0.14 -0.15 
        
GDP 
BUL 40 44 44 44 45 5 10 
ROM 42 47 47 47 49 7 15 
        
INFL 
BUL 7.6 12 2.5 3 3.4 -4.2 -2.7 
ROM 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 0.9 -6.1 
        
GINI 
BUL 35.3 35.9 33.4 33.2 n/a -2.1 8.2 
ROM 37.8 36 34.9 33.3 33.2 -4.5 2.3 
        
COR 
BUL 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.6 3.3 -0.8 -0.8 
ROM 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 -0.1 0.7 
 
What has changed? Most notably, DEM is now completely reversed. GDP continued 
its upward trend in both cases, but its growth has considerably slowed down. In 
fact, if Romania and Bulgaria were included in a full QCA with these new figures, 
GDP would both receive (0) values, as they have fallen under the 10 cut-off point. 
Finally, both inflation and corruption have risen in Romania, but not in Bulgaria.  
The answer to this smaller research question is then quite straightforward: The 
solution identified for the entire set of CEECs has limited applicability when used 
in the same conditions, but a different time-frame. Romania fits into the solution 
perfectly – either rising inflation or rising corruption can explain democratic 
quality decline here. However, it does not work in the case of Bulgaria, where the 
only major change since 2007 has been a decline in GDP/capita.  
This is a good example of Ragin’s concept of modest generalization. Post-accession 
Bulgaria and Romania obviously continue to share major background 
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characteristics with the original set of CEECs, which would lead us to expect that 
the solution could be applied successfully. As it turns out, it fully explains one case, 
but tells us nothing about the other – a reminder of the fact that QCA is best suited 
for examining small or medium sets of cases, but should be used with caution 
when the purpose of research is to formulate general causal inferences about a 
certain phenomenon.  
Finally, note that both Romania and Bulgaria subscribe to the primarily economic 
explanation of democratic decline: Romania through rising inflation and Bulgaria 
through declining GDP/capita.  
 
4.3. THE ROLE OF THE EU 
This final section of the analysis looks at the post-accession impact of the EU on 
democratic quality in CEECs. It should be made clear at this point that this is by no 
means an exhaustive discussion. In part, this is due to the fact that systematic 
studies evaluating the EU’s influence over post-accession democracies are still on-
going, with only a few containing findings that fit into the topic of my thesis. 
Further, such a discussion cannot ignore the crucial role that political 
conditionality played in improving the quality of democracy before accession.  
This section follows three main arguments. The first is that conditionality and the 
mechanisms of EU rule adoption in CEECs are relatively easy to operationalize, as 
they rest on a firm theoretical basis and have been the topic of numerous studies 
throughout the last decade. The second argument is that removing conditionality 
from the picture once membership status is achieved significantly reduces 
operationalization options. This is the main reason I could not include the role of 
the EU in the QCA part of this study. Finally, the third argument is that the EU’s 
impact may potentially result in another typology – democracy by integration, 
opposite democracy by design. One study in articular (Dimitrova and Pridham, 
2004) asks whether the former type may, contrary to expectations, prove weaker 
in terms of quality.  
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4.3.1. Pre-accession: conditionality and rule adoption 
There is an extensive body of literature today supporting the argument that, 
through political conditionality, the EU has had unprecedented influence over the 
policies and institutional structure of CEECs. 
Viewed in the context of democratic embeddedness, the EU belongs to the external 
sphere of international integration. Debates and contributions built around the 
role of political conditionality repeatedly emphasize that the mechanisms of EU 
rule adoption by candidate countries have a significant impact on the promotion of 
democratic norms in CEECs.  
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2005) focus on the institutional aspect of rule 
adoption. In this respect, they classify rule adoption according to two dimensions: 
likelihood of adoption and implementation and enforcement of rules (as simple 
legal transposition is not sufficient to indicate effective implementation.) 
Furthermore, they make two additional distinctions: domestic- versus EU-driven 
rule adoption and rational versus values-based motivation of domestic actors. 
Based on these elements, they proceed to describe three mechanisms of rule 
adoption: the external incentives, lesson-drawing, and the social learning models.  
The external incentive model is particularly relevant for EU-driven rule adoption. 
It is a rationalist bargaining system based on exchanging information and forms of 
leverage (promises and threats) Under the external incentives model, a 
government adopts EU rules if the benefits of the EU rewards exceed the costs of 
adoption.  
Through conditionality, the EU applies a reactive strategy, whereby it rewards a 
state that has successfully implemented a set of rules and withholds the reward 
when the state fails to do so. Since there is no active form of sanction for failing to 
implement EU rules, this is a way of effectively making the state responsible for 
creating favourable conditions for rule implementation, rather than setting the 
reinforcement responsibility on the EU. In this respect, it may be argued that the 
external incentives model is both EU- and state-driven. However, the model 
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assumes that in the absence of external incentives, the state would have no 
motivation to comply with EU rules.  
Schimmelfennig (2004) applies the external incentives model in combination with 
QCA to examine CEECs’ compliance with EU rules. His findings suggest that a 
credible perspective of EU accession, combined with low adaptation costs for the 
target countries were sufficient conditions to explain compliance.  
Gherghina’s QCA test on 20 post-communist countries (2009) reveals that 
democratization was facilitated either by the promise of accession, or by a high 
GDP/capita trend. Conversely, countries where democratization was slow or 
particularly problematic combined the absence of the promise of accession with a 
declining GDP/capita trend. Additionally, his findings, along with those of 
Mendelski (2009), suggest that the legacy of authoritarian regimes has gradually 
diminished in the post-communist space, to the point where it has now become 
insignificant. Thus, EU conditionality becomes the main driving force 
supplementing the impact of domestic conditions on democratization.  
Grabbe (2001, 2005) argues that, on the contrary, during the accession process the 
EU shifted its priority from legitimacy to efficiency, thus creating a situation where 
its efforts to promote democratic norms came at odds with the incentives it 
created. This contradiction resulted from the fact that, while the EU promoted the 
involvement of political institutions outside the executive to help implement the 
acquis, the incentives and constraints of the accession process concerned the 
executive. In shifting its bias from legitimacy to efficiency, Grabbe argues that, in a 
sense, the EU exported its democratic deficit to CEECs. This argument finds 
support with Zielonka (2007), who shows that national parliaments in CEECs have 
been the great losers of the integration process.  
The unifying theme of the debate surrounding political conditionality and the 
promotion of democratic norms to CEECs is that the former has undeniably 
established itself as a driving force behind the latter. However, difficulties arise in 
evaluating the impact of the EU when political conditionality, with its system of 
incentives and sanctions, disappears from the picture.  
Empirical research, like Schimmelfennig’s and Gherghina’s reveal that, as long as 
political conditionality is present, the EU’s influence is relatively easy to 
operationalize. Usually this is done in reference to whether or not a country has 
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entered into a binding relation with the EU. For example, Gherghina finds that, in 
countries where the promise of accession was firmly in place, the democratization 
process was easier and led to better consolidated democratic system.   
All of this certainly does not imply that once membership status is achieved, the 
influence of the EU disappears. If anything, the concept of linkage, which I briefly 
addressed in Chapter 3, offers solid reasoning to support the argument that it has 
actually intensified. The problem is that, at the same time, it has become more 
diffuse, and therefore harder to quantify.  
 
 
4.3.2. After accession: the problem of operationalization 
In the early stages of my research design, I considered operationalizing the post-
accession impact of the EU in terms of speed: countries that consistently complied 
with EU rules during the accession process and gained access on schedule would 
receive a value of (1). Romania and Bulgaria, as laggards and problematic cases, 
would receive a value of (0). On closer examination though, this strategy showed 
some methodological flaws. Including the speed of rule adoption as a condition of 
democratic quality would not have been particularly difficult: it rests on some 
(albeit limited) theoretical support, and dichotomization is quite straightforward. 
Furthermore, decline could easily be associated with slow/problematic rule 
adoption, and vice-versa.  
However, defined in these terms, the speed of rule adoption would simply not pass 
the test of logical minimization in QCA. Let us consider an exercise where QCA is 
conducted for the entire 2004-2011 reference period: in this case both Romania 
and Bulgaria are examples of democratic improvement, but have (0) values for the 
speed of rule adoption, whereas all other countries (most of which are cases of 
decline) have a value of (1). As with the other two strictly dichotomous variables 
(PARL and PR) that vary only slightly along the entire sample, it is quite plausible 
that the speed of rule adoption would not even make it into the intermediate 
solutions. Even if this were the case, the principles of logical minimization would 
not allow a condition with such disproportionate variation to transfer into the final 
result.  
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Since there is consistent evidence to support the notion that the EU had, and 
continues to have significant influence over CEE democracies, a result that does 
not contain the corresponding element would be an inaccurate description of 
reality. For these reasons, I abandoned the speed of rule adoption and briefly 
considered another option.  
In a more systematic attempt to operationalize the impact of the EU, Sedelmeier 
(2008) proposes two measurements for post-accession compliance with EU 
legislation – transposition and infringement. The first concerns EU directives being 
transposed into national legislation, of which the member states must notify the 
Commission. The second concerns the violation of implemented EU legislation 
within member states and the subsequent infringement procedures. Both 
indicators are constructed on the basis of data published by the European 
Commission.  
Two difficulties arise when evaluating these measurements in the context of my 
thesis. Firstly, as Sedelmeier himself points out, there is a problem with data 
reliability: in the case of transposition, the measure covers only one type of EU law 
(directives) and measures its formal implementation. It is far more difficult to 
measure whether a rule has been transposed correctly and put into practice. 
Similarly, data on infringement only covers such cases as have been detected and 
acted upon by the Commission, and as such, offer only a limited view on the 
subject.  
The second difficulty comes from the complexity of these indicators. Even with a 
relatively limited time-frame, the volume of data necessary to compile these 
measurements goes beyond the scope of this thesis. It would additionally result in 
an index that is disproportionately complicated compared to the other variables 
used in the model.  
This leaves us with very little room for maneuvering: we can no longer measure 
the impact of the EU in terms of rule adoption, as defined in a pre-accession 
context. But neither can they be defined in terms of post-accession rule 
adoption/violation without considerable difficulty. It is perhaps enough, at this 
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point, to recognize that, while the EU’s influence obviously continues to exist, it is 
too diffuse to conceptualize in such a limited space.  
Interestingly enough, Sedelmeier finds that, in terms of post-accession compliance, 
CEECs have performed unexpectedly well, practically out-performing all of the old 
member states during the first few years following accession. He suggests that two 
factors related to pre-accession experiences may explain this trend: the 
susceptibility of new member-states to shaming, and an institutional investment in 
the legislative capacity.  
In support of Sedelmeier, Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) find that there has been a 
surprising lack of backslide in political reforms after accession. One of the 
explanations they put forward is the support offered by international factors other 
than EU incentives. Most notably, the increased linkage between CEECs and old 
member states began to function as an alternate influence channel, replacing 
conditionality-based incentives.   
 
4.3.4. Summary: democracy by integration and democracy by 
design 
In this section, I tried to compensate for the absence of a systematic account of the 
EU’s post-accession impact on CEE democracies. On the one hand, I explained that 
pre-accession impact is relatively easy to measure and lends itself well to QCA-
based studies. On the other hand, once membership status is achieved, the impact 
becomes too diffuse to be manageable in the limited scope of this thesis.  
In general, literature appears to suggest that the post-accession impact of the EU 
has remained both significant and positive. However, in one particularly 
interesting stance, Dimitrova and Pridham (2004) claim that this may not be the 
entire story. They propose that “democracy by integration” is a form of top-down 
promotion of democratic norms unique to the EU. Opposed to this is the concept of 
“democracy by design”, whereby the introduction and consolidation of democratic 
norms is internally motivated and primarily driven by the state.  
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Dimitrova and Pridham ask whether democracy by integration is liable to create 
weaker democracies than its alternative. Evidence from Merkel in particular 
suggests that for CEECs, this was not entirely the case. The findings in this thesis 
describe the conditions under which democratic quality varies. As I have shown, 
these conditions belong to the sphere of external embeddedness. With regards to 
internal embeddedness – the interdependency of partial democratic regimes – 
Merkel argues that the majority of CEECs are firmly in the realm of liberal 
democracy and, as such, the main source of weakness lies with elements that may 
destabilize external embeddedness.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
5.1. Summary 
The focus of this thesis was to identify those conditions which influenced the post-
accession evolution of democracy in CEECs. Between 2004 and 2011. Throughout my 
research, I set three tasks.  
The first of these was to situate CEECs within current theoretical debates attempting 
to reconcile the need to re-conceptualize democracy with the dilemma of 
identifying a manageable number of democracy varieties. In doing so, the most 
significant finding was that the majority of CEECs are not defective democracies. 
Merkel, whose theoretical stance I adopted in this study, explains that, with the 
exception of Romania and Bulgaria (illiberal) and Latvia (exclusive), all remaining 
CEECs qualify as liberal democracies. 
My main concern at this point was not to identify additional typologies that these 
countries might fit into, but to explain how and why democratic quality evolved 
after accession. Thus, my second and most important research task was to identify 
the specific conditions explaining the decline and improvement in the region. My 
findings were as follows: 
Overall, this study lends consistent empirical support to Merkel’s claim that 
external embeddedness is the source of potential explanations for how and why 
the quality of democracy varies across countries and over time.  
On a methodological level, the adjustments I made to Buhlmann’s study in 
response to QCA technicalities and the nature of the sample yielded a viable model. 
The inclusion of corruption in particular was fully justified, not only because it 
improved the model in terms of consistency and solved the problem of one 
counter-intuitive configuration, but also because it was one of the two conditions 
that transfered into the final solution.  
My main finding for this second research task was that the behavior of inflation 
emerged as the most powerful explanation for both the improvement and the 
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decline of democratic quality in the entire sample. By re-examining the individual 
cases in light of this finding, I was able to identify more specific levels of influence.  
Accordingly, where inflation acted as a favorable condition for democratic quality, 
it did so in three ways: through small price fluctuations, the ability to bring rapidly 
rising inflation under control, and strong declining trends to compensate for 
overall high inflation. As a paradox, countries where inflation impacted negatively 
on democratic quality showed relatively small price fluctuations. This shows that 
overall greater price stability did not translate into declining inflation, particularly 
in the context of the economic crisis.  
Corruption emerged as an alternative explanation for democratic quality decline. 
However, the way in which this variable was operationalized revealed that it may 
be a weaker explanation for decline than inflation. Nevertheless, corruption fully 
confirms its corresponding hypothesis, and because of this remains a valid 
solution.  
An additional finding showed that, unsurprisingly for a QCA-based study, the 
model has limited applicability. Applying the solution to data from Romania and 
Bulgaria over the 2007-2011 time-frame revealed that both rising inflation and 
increased corruption are present in Romania, but neither appear in Bulgaria. In the 
later case, the only explanation for post-accession decline was a negative 
GDP/capita trend. It is worth noting though, that while the model is evidently 
limited, the economic nature of the explanation remains consistent.  
The third task was to evaluate the EU’s post-accession impact on democratic 
quality in CEECs. While an empirical approach was not possible here, an overview 
of some of the most recent studies on the subject showed that the influence of the 
EU on CEE democracies remained both significant and positive after accession. On 
the whole CEECs also continued to successfully comply with EU legislation.  
Finally there is no evidence at the moment that the EU’s “democracy by 
integration” method of norm promotion has given birth to weak democracy. For 
the majority of CEECs, internal embeddedness is appears quite solid, so that the 
main source of weakness continues to lie in the sphere of external embeddedness.  
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5.2. Limitations 
This study is certainly not without limitations. The most important of these is its 
failure to account for the post-accession impact of the EU on democratic quality in 
CEECs in the same way that it did for domestic variables. This hinges on the 
difficulty of finding a manageable variable to reflect this element. I have attempted 
to compensate for this by giving an overview of recent scientific efforts to evaluate 
the EU’s impact once conditionality is removed.  
One other limitation was revealed to come from the nature of QCA. Both solutions 
were consistent with their hypotheses and therefore valid, but corruption may 
turn out to be a weaker explanation for decline, due to the way it was 
operationalized. GINI is in a similar situation; except that, while it does not appear 
in the final solutions and does not therefore pose a problem, it consistently 
behaves in an atypical way.  
The restricted scope of this thesis means that some limitations stemming from the 
choice of method are inevitable. Fortunately, these limitations do not translate 
here into solution inconsistencies. Rather, they indicate aspects that can be 
improved upon in future research. For instance, it is possible that using a more 
complex method, such as fuzzy-sets or multi-value QCA may considerably develop 
the solution. However, csQCA, albeit more limited, served the purpose of this 
thesis quite well. 
Finally, the limited applicability of the solution is not in itself a limitation, but 
illustrates Ragin’s concept of modest generalization.  
 
5.3. Avenues for future research 
I suggest that three elements appearing in this thesis merit further attention and 
may combine to lend empirical support to the current debate around re-
conceptualizing democracy.  
The first of these is the Democracy Barometer. As an instrument, it is quite new 
and has only been tested on 30 established democracies between 1990 and 2007. 
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Despite this, it has the potential to emerge as a serious competitor to Freedom 
House’s Democracy Score in Central and Eastern Europe. Both methodology and 
extensive data sources are openly available23 so that, for instance, a comparative 
study of how the two indexes perform in CEECs is feasible, albeit quite demanding.  
The second aspect deals with the need to conceptualize the EU’s post-accession 
influence in a way that would make it more easily manageable. Sedelmeier (2008) 
already suggested looking into post-accession compliance with EU legislation. He 
proves that this is a viable measurement, but again, the volume of data necessary 
to compile an indicator makes it difficult to achieve this in a limited space.  
The third and final aspect has to do with Dimitrova and Pridham concepts of 
democracy by integration and democracy by design. As already mentioned, it does 
not appear the authors’ explicit intention to create another typology here. 
Nevertheless, they recognize that democratization through the promise of 
integration has resulted into a unique form of democracy promotion intrinsic to 
EU-candidate country interactions. They ask whether, compared to democracy by 
design, this form may yield weaker democracies; but they do not, in the end, offer 
an answer.  
I suggest that theoretically expanding this third element and finding ways to 
incorporate the first two into a single model may potentially result in one of the 
most complex available explanations for how and why the quality of democracy 
varies in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
 
                                                          
23
 See http://www.democracybarometer.org/ 
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